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FRAGMENTATION NODES: A STUDY IN
FINANCIAL INNOVATION, COMPLEXITY,
AND SYSTEMIC RISK
Kathryn Judge*
This Article presents a case study in how complexity arising from the evolu-
tion and prolferation of a financial innovation can increase systemic risk The
subject of the case study is the securitization of home loans, an innovation which
played a critical and still not fully understood role in the 2007-2009 financial cri-
sis. The Article introduces the term 'fragmentation node" for these transaction
structures, and it shows how specic sources of complexity inherent in fragmen-
tation nodes limited transparency andflexibility in ways that undermined the sta-
bility of the financial system. In addition to shedding new light on the processes
through which financial innovations become so complex and how that complexity
contributes to new sources ofsystemic risk, the Article considers the tools regula-
tors will need to tackle these sources of systemic risk. The policy analysis shows
that disclosure, a tool commonly used in financial regulation, will not suffice. At
times, regulators should target these new sources of systemic risk directly by
seeking to reduce the length and complexity of the chain connecting investor and
investment. The Article suggests some modest steps regulators could have taken
prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, such as a transaction tax targeting serial
fragmentation nodes, to illustrate how such reforms might work in practice. It al-
so explains why the dynamics revealed in this case study are almost certain to
arise again, even if in slightly diferent form.
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INTRODUCTION
Two of the most pressing issues in financial regulation are systemic risk
and the increasing complexity of the capital markets.' This Article sheds new
1. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87
WASH. U. L. REv. 211, 212-13 (2009) (identifying complexity "as the greatest financial-
market challenge of the future" and one of the three core causes of the 2007-2009 financial
crisis); Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System,
33 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 671, 673 (2010) ("Going forward, the central problem for fi-
nancial regulation. ... is to reduce systemic risk.").
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light on each of these issues and the connection between them through a case
study of a particular financial innovation that played a key role in the 2007-
2009 financial crisis-the securitization of home loans.
This examination comes at a critical juncture for systemic risk and its regu-
lation. Many of the key reforms adopted in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act2 and other policy responses to the 2007-2009 fi-
nancial crisis seek to increase the stability of the financial system by imposinI
new costs and restrictions on banks and other large financial institutions.
While such regulations may increase the stability of the financial institutions
regulated, they also increase the economic gains from financial innovations that
shift financing activities out of regulated institutions and into the capital mar-
kets. Securitization is precisely such an innovation. Securitization entails the
pooling of a group of cash-producing assets, like home loans, into a newly
created entity against which multiple classes of securities are issued. The struc-
tures created-which this Article calls "fragmentation nodes"-are a critical
feature of the shadow banking system through which the capital markets pro-
vide close substitutes for goods and services historically provided by banks.4
As a result, the economic gains from innovations like securitization are likely
to be even greater in the years ahead than they were in the years leading up to
the financial crisis. It also means that the reforms adopted to produce a more
stable financial system are unlikely to achieve that aim unless complemented
by efforts to address the corresponding changes they are likely to induce in the
capital markets.
Even if inadequately addressed in the policy reforms adopted thus far, this
point is not novel. There is a significant and growing body of literature on the
interplay between the traditional banking sector and the capital markets and
ways that we might extend the types of regulations used to limit systemic risk
in the traditional banking sector to the capital markets.5 This Article goes fur-
ther. It argues that the shadow banking system not only gives rise to sources of
systemic risk akin to those that arise in the traditional banking sector, but that it
also gives rise to new sources of systemic risk for which we have no precedent.
This Article's central claim is that specific sources of complexity inherent
in fragmentation nodes-core features of the shadow banking system-impede
2. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
3. See infra Part I.C.
4. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcoN. AcTivrry, Fall 2010, at 261 (2010) (describing the central role
played by the shadow banking system in the 2007-2009 financial crisis and identifying secu-
ritization as one of three core components of the shadow banking system); Erik F. Gerding,
The Shadow Banking System and Its Legal Origins 11-18 (Aug. 23, 2011) (unpublished ma-
nuscript) (on file with author) (describing the growth of the shadow banking system and
identifying securitization as the system's "central artery").
5. See infra Part I.B.
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transparency and flexibility in ways that increase systemic risk. More specifi-
cally, it identifies particular sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation
nodes; it explains why, as a theoretical matter, those sources of complexity may
give rise to systemic risk as fragmentation nodes backed by a particular asset
type spread; and it draws on evidence suggesting that the theorized sources of
systemic risk became manifest and contributed to the 2007-2009 financial cri-
sis. By focusing on sources of complexity that are likely to be present in other
financial innovations that shift financing activities out of banks and into the
shadow banking system, this Article suggests that these dynamics are likely to
arise again. It also enables policymakers and market participants to identify
new financial innovations as potentially troubling even if, superficially, they
can be distinguished from the securitization vehicles backed by home loans that
were central to the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
In addition to contributing to the conversation about systemic risk general-
ly, this Article also draws upon and contributes to two more narrow bodies of
work. One of these bodies consists of the numerous accounts of the processes
through which the securitization of home loans contributed to the 2007-2009
financial crisis,6 and the other body focuses on the interactions among financial
innovation, complexity, and systemic risk more generally.7 Premised on the
commonly held assumption that the 2007-2009 financial crisis was the result of
myriad causes, this Article seeks to complement rather than displace these al-
ternative accounts. Its contributions arise largely from its methodology. By
approaching these issues through a case study of how the complexity that re-
sulted as a particular financial innovation arose, evolved, spread, and became a
significant source of systemic risk, it provides valuable new insights into the
processes through which financial innovations become so complex, and it elu-
cidates the challenges and opportunities facing regulators charged with reduc-
ing systemic risk.
The case study begins with a brief history of the evolution and proliferation
of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations
6. See infra Part III and sources cited therein.
7. See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED
THE FINANCIAL MARKETS (2d ed. 2009); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity and
Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 663
(2008); Schwarcz, supra note 1; Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of
Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457
(1993) (book review).
8. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Manufacturing Tail Risk: A Perspective on the
Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 4 FOuND. & TRENDS FIN. 247, 292 (2009) ("There is no
shortage of proximate causes of the financial crisis."); Bill Thomas et al., What Caused the
Financial Crisis?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011, at A21 ("[T]he crisis was the product of 10
factors. Only when taken together can they offer a sufficient explanation of what hap-
pened.. . .").
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(CDOs) backed by MBSs.9 MBSs and CDOs are created through securitization
transactions in which assets (mortgages and MBSs, respectively) are bundled
together into a newly created entity against which securities are issued. This
account draws attention to the fact that these complex transaction structures are
the product of a series of incremental innovations that accumulated over time.
The incremental nature of this process is critical to understanding how these
transactions became so complex and why that complexity was not subject to
greater regulatory or market scrutiny prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
The case study introduces the term "fragmentation node" for the nexus of
contractual and other arrangements put into place each time an MBS or CDO is
consummated. This term draws attention to the way such transactions perma-
nently transform the relationship between investor and investment, making it
easier to conceptualize the ways that the spread of MBSs and CDOs fundamen-
tally altered the landscape of the capital markets. The descriptive account also
examines the attributes of fragmentation nodes that make them complex. Four
specific sources of complexity are highlighted: (1) fragmentation, (2) the crea-
tion of contingent and dynamic economic interests in the underlying assets, (3)
a latent competitive tendency among different classes of investors, and (4) the
lengthening of the chain separating an investor from the assets ultimately un-
derlying its investment. Identifying these specific sources of complexity is crit-
ical to the analysis that follows. While the term "complexity" appears often in
descriptions of modem finance, it has been used accurately but loosely to de-
scribe a wide array of phenomena. Defining the complexity at issue more nar-
rowly enables this Article to examine with greater precision the effects of that
complexity.
The Article builds upon its descriptive foundation by examining how the
identified sources of complexity contribute to two distinct sources of systemic
risk-information loss and "stickiness." Its approach to each merges theory
about why the identified sources of complexity may be expected to give rise to
the phenomenon, and why each phenomenon, in turn, may be expected to in-
crease systemic risk, with evidence from the 2007-2009 financial crisis. More
specifically, the Article shows how the spread of fragmentation nodes led to a
pervasive loss of information about the quality of the underlying home loans
and the value of MBS and CDO securities backed by them. This loss of infor-
mation likely contributed to the bubbles that preceded the 2007-2009 financial
crisis, and it set the stage for the paralyzing uncertainty which was central to
the unfolding of the crisis. Similarly, coordination problems arising from the
fragmentation and repackaging of economic interests in home loans made it ex-
ceptionally difficult to modify the terms of those loans, making the original
9. Except when context otherwise requires, the term "CDO" is used in this Article to
refer to CDO transactions in which MBSs constitute one of the primary underlying assets.
The term "MBS" is used for transactions backed by residential mortgages, not commercial
property.
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terms of the loans more "sticky" than they would have been otherwise. The re-
sultant stickiness in the original terms of the underlying loans increased the li-
kelihood of foreclosure. The excess foreclosures that resulted caused home
prices to fall further, setting off a feedback loop of rising defaults, more forec-
losures, and further price declines. While these phenomena have been noted in
other accounts of the crisis, this Article is the first to show how each arises
from specific sources of complexity inherent in the packaging of home loans
into fragmentation nodes.
The Article concludes by considering the type of policies that are likely to
be effective in reducing these sources of systemic risk. Once we recognize the
systemic consequences of the highlighted sources of complexity, we can appre-
ciate why it may be appropriate, and perhaps even necessary, for regulators to
target that complexity directly. Prior to the crisis, regulators could have done
this by discouraging serial fragmentation nodes (like CDOs containing MBSs)
and encouraging simpler alternatives (like covered bonds). Mindful of the risks
inherent in regulatory interventions that encourage particular financial innova-
tions and discourage others, the policy analysis suggests that such interventions
may nonetheless be warranted in order to facilitate the effective functioning of
the market forces upon which we have traditionally relied to produce a stable
and efficient system for allocating capital. It also draws attention to the myriad
ways that regulators may implement such policies without mandating or ban-
ning the use of any particular transaction structure.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides an overview of systemic
risk and its regulation, describing traditional approaches and the new chal-
lenges facing regulators. It briefly describes some of the key policy responses
to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and it situates the case study that follows
within current debates about the regulation of systemic risk. Part II provides a
descriptive account of how MBS and CDO transactions came to be and how
they work. Securitization is not a recent financial innovation, and a number of
legal scholars have provided rich accounts of the role of securitization in mod-
em finance and associated legal issues.10 This account complements the exist-
ing literature by taking a different approach to the subject. It focuses on the
ways securitization transactions backed by home loans evolved and spread in
response to market forces and other pressures. Part II also introduces the notion
10. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996); Edward M. lacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitization
and Asymmetric Information, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 161 (2005); Kenneth C. Kettering, Securiti-
zation and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDozo
L. REV. 1553 (2008); Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's Pers-
pective, 76 TEX. L. REv. 595 (1998); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41
CoNN. L. REv. 1313 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the Sub-
prime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REv. 549 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Finan-
cial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REv. 373 (2008)
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets].
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of a fragmentation node and identifies aspects of securitized transaction struc-
tures that make them complex.
Part III examines the two phenomena arising from the proliferation of
fragmentation nodes that contribute to systemic risk-information loss and
stickiness. This Part shows how the complexity of fragmentation nodes gives
rise to each; it considers how each phenomenon may, in general, give rise to
systemic risk; and it examines evidence of each phenomenon arising and creat-
ing problems in the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Part IV sets forth the Article's
normative claim that, because complexity arising from the spread of financial
innovations may contribute to systemic risk, it is an issue about which financial
regulators should be concerned. This Part proposes specific regulations that
might have been reasonable for regulators to implement prior to the 2007-2009
financial crisis had they been attuned to the dynamics highlighted here, and it
explains why similar modes of intervention may be warranted in the years
ahead.
I. REGULATING SYSTEMIC RISK
Systemic risk may be understood as "the risk that the financial system will
fail to function properly because of widespread distress." 1 It has long been
recognized that a failure in the functioning of the financial system imposes sig-
nificant externalities, adversely affecting Rersons far removed from the finan-
cial institutions at the core of the crisis. The long and deep recession that
arose out of the 2007-2009 financial crisis served as a powerful reminder of
these externalities and hence of the value of regulations that reduce systemic
risk.13 The crisis also revealed significant shortcomings in traditional ap-
proaches to regulating systemic risk. This Part examines the notion of systemic
risk and evolving approaches to its regulation. It concludes by situating the case
study that follows within current debates about systemic risk regulation.
11. Jean Helwege, Financial Firm Bankruptcy and Systemic Risk, REGULATION, Sum-
mer 2009, at 24, 24; see also Hal S. Scott, Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of
Capital Regulation, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 763, 763-64 (2010) (explaining that "[s]ystemic
risk can be defined in many ways," including, "[m]ost broadly,. . . the risk that a national, or
the global, financial system will break down").
12. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME Is DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 224-25 (2009) (providing empirical data on the high costs
of financial crises); see also MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, at xvii (Geneva Reports on the World Econ. 11, 2009) ("It is
perhaps banal by now to point out that the reason why we try to prevent banking crises is
that the costs to society are invariably enormous and exceed the private cost to individual
financial institutions.").
13. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION, at xii (2009); Phillip Swagel, The Cost of the Financial Cri-
sis: The Impact of the September 2008 Economic Collapse (Pew Fin. Reform Project, Brief-
ing Paper No. 18, 2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/EconomicMobility/Cost-of-the-Crisis-final.pdf.
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A. Traditional Approaches
Many sources of systemic risk are well known, and tools designed to ad-
dress those sources of systemic risk are well established. Historically, the para-
digmatic source of systemic risk was a banking crisis. 14 This is because of the
central role banks play in moving capital from savers to productive undertak-
ings, and because of instability inherent in banks' structure. Banks tend to use
short-term liabilities, like demand deposits, to fund long-term assets, like loans
to small businesses, so even a solvent bank may lack the requisite funds if too
many depositors demand their money back at the same time. 15 And because of
the interconnectedness of banks and the potential for problems at one bank to
signal problems at others, a run on one bank can lead to the failure of other
banks and an overall contraction of the financial system. The potential for bank
failures to result in a financial crisis is particularly great when there is a high
degree of correlation in the risks to which banks are exposed, which increases
the likelihood of numerous banks failing within a short period. 16
Because bank failures were a primary source of systemic risk, many regu-
lations designed to reduce systemic risk applied solely to banks, as traditionally
defined, and sought to reduce systemic risk by reducing the likelihood that any
individual bank would fail.17 Capital adequacy requirements, which require
each bank to hold a set amount of equity capital, usually established by refer-
ence to the size and riskiness of a bank's assets, are a classic form of systemic
risk regulation. They reduce the likelihood of a financial crisis by increasing
the ability of banks to withstand losses regardless of their source.18
As the cornerstone of efforts to reduce systemic risk, capital adequacy re-
quirements also illustrate many of the challenges inherent in this endeavor. One
drawback is that such regulations can impose significant costs. Requiring a
bank to fund itself in a particular manner irrespective of the bank's preferences
reduces the rate at which the bank puts capital to productive uses, and has other
social costs.19 A related issue is that these regulations do not, and are not de-
14. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 199 (2008) ("The classic
example of systemic risk in this context is a 'bank run' . . . .").
15. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. EcoN. 401, 401-02 (1983) (describing this phenomenon, and why it may
also therefore be rational for a depositor to demand his money back even if he believes his
bank to be solvent if he expects other depositors in that bank to demand a return of their
funds).
16. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Measuring Systemic Risk 3 (May 2010) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1573171.
17. See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 7 ("[R]egulation has been exces-
sively focussed on seeking to improve the behaviour and risk management practices of indi-
vidual banks . . . .").
18. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 11, at 764.
19. See, e.g., RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINEs: How HIDDEN FRAcTURES STILL
THREATEN THE WORLD EcoNoMY 174-75 (2010); Scott, supra note 11, at 773-74; see also
infra Part I.B.
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signed to, eliminate the targeted source of systemic risk completely.20 Because
higher capital adequacy requirements simultaneously reduce the likelihood of
bank failure and increase the social cost of the regulation, the aim of regulators
is not to set requirements so high as to prevent any risk of a bank failure. Ra-
ther, their aim is to find a reasonable balance between these countervailing in-
terests. This challenge is accentuated by the apples-to-oranges nature of the
comparison, as the cost of restricting the flow of capital in ways that limit eco-
nomic growth when times are good is not easily measured and compared with
the risk of a fundamental breakdown in the system through which that capital
flows. 21
B. Systemic Risk and Its Regulation Today
While bank failures remain an important source of systemic risk, changes
in the roles played by banks and other financial institutions, greater integration
between banks and capital markets in the process of financial intermediation,
and other transformative developments in the capital markets have created an
environment in which the potential sources of systemic risk have become far
more numerous and diverse.22 Among the most significant changes has been
the dramatic growth of the shadow banking system, which not only enables the
capital markets to provide services and products traditionally provided by
banks but also changes the roles played by banks in the process of financial in-
termediation. 23
At the same time, the notion of what constitutes a "systemic risk" has
broadened. Geoffrey Miller and Gerald Rosenfeld, for example, have recently
drawn attention to "intellectual hazard," that is, "the tendency of behavioral bi-
ases to interfere with accurate thought and analysis within complex organiza-
tions," as a source of systemic risk.24 They explain that "[b]ecause [intellectual
hazard] affects organizations that are large, interconnected, or linked to many
20. See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 12, at xx (acknowledging that "we
cannot hope to prevent crises completely").
21. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 11, at 773-74 (describing "the difficult challenges fac-
ing regulators attempting to specify the appropriate amount of capital for a given quantum of
risk").
22. See Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 200 ("Although a chain of bank failures remains
an important symbol of systemic risk, [as a result of] the ongoing trend towards disintermed-
iation ... ,capital markets themselves are increasingly central to any examination of system-
ic risk.").
23. See, e.g., Acharya et al., supra note 8, at 258-59; Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song
Shin, Money, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy, 99 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 600,
601 figs.1, 2, 3 & 4 (2009); Gorton & Metrick, supra note 4, at 261, 269; Gerding, supra
note 4, at 4-5.
24. Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Bi-
ases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 807, 810 (2010).
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other similarly situated organizations," and because it "poses a threat to the
smooth, orderly, and efficient functioning of the world's financial markets,"
intellectual hazard is appropriately characterized as a systemic risk and one that
regulators should seek to address.25 Other academics have shown a similar wil-
lingness to apply the term "systemic risk" to a variety of phenomena, so long as
they increase the probability or potential magnitude of a financial crisis.26
Simultaneous with this recognition of the diverse range of the potential
sources of systemic risk has been an evolution in thinking about how best to
reduce systemic risk. A core flaw in traditional approaches to systemic risk
regulation revealed by the 2007-2009 financial crisis is the almost exclusive
focus on trying to maintain the safety and soundness of individual financial in-
stitutions. As explained by a group of leading economists:
[The current approach to systemic regulation] implicitly assumes that we can
make the system as a whole safe by simply trying to make sure that individual
banks are safe. This sounds like a truism, but in practice it represents a fallacy
of composition. In trying to make themselves safer, banks, and other highly
leveraged financial intermediaries, can behave in a way that collectively un-
dermines the system. 27
This insight has led many academics and policymakers to recognize that in ad-
dition to "microprudential" regulations focused on individual institutions, regu-
latory efforts to manage systemic risk must also take a "macroprudential" ap-
proach focused on maintaining the stability of the financial system as a
whole.28
Others have been even more critical in their assessments of capital adequa-
cy requirements and of other efforts to reduce systemic risk by imposing costly
new restrictions on banks and other regulated financial institutions. Steven
Schwarcz has described regulatory responses that "focus on banks, not mar-
kets" as "anachronistic." 29 In his view, because of "new trends in the global
marketplace," which "enable[] companies to access the ultimate source of
funds, the capital markets, without going through banks or other financial in-
termediaries[, a]n exclusive bank-focused approach simply does not keep up
with underlying changes in the financial system." 30
25. Id. at 812-13; see also id. at 835.
26. See, e.g., Amir E. Khandani, Andrew W. Lo & Robert C. Merton, Systemic Risk
and the Refinancing Ratchet Effect 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
15,362, 2009) (identifying as a significant source of systemic risk the "ratchet effect," whe-
reby it is easier for homeowners to increase than to decrease the amount of leverage in their
homes). See generally Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 197 (showing how definitions of systemic
risk "are inconsistent in several ways" and noting that "[t]he only common factor in these
definitions is that a trigger event causes a chain of bad economic consequences").
27. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 12, at xvii.
28. See, e.g., Beverly Hirtle et al., Macroprudential Supervision of Financial Institu-
tions: Lessons from the SCAP 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 409, 2009).
29. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 10, at 374.
30. Id. at 374-75.
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Gary Gorton goes further in his critique of capital adequacy requirements.
Gorton draws attention to the potential for the shadow banking system to pro-
vide close substitutes for products and services traditionally provided by banks,
as well as competition from foreign banks. In light of these alternatives, he ar-
gues that once the market "determine[s] the capital ratio [which banks should
maintain, any] regulatory increase above this level will result in a decline in the
size of the official banking system."31 In his view, enforcing capital adequacy
requirements will result in less capital flowing through regulated banks and
more capital flowing through alternatives, like the shadow banking system. Ac-
cording to Gorton, "The same argument about the uselessness of capital re-
quirements applies to any restriction imposed on banks . .. where entry is not
limited."32
Even if one believes that capital adequacy requirements and other efforts to
restrict risk-taking by financial institutions should continue to play a central
role in limiting systemic risk, these critiques draw attention to an important, un-
intended consequence of such regulations. By making it more costly for banks
and other regulated financial institutions to extend and hold loans, regulations
that target banks increase the potential economic gains from financial innova-
tions that enable financing activities traditionally performed by banks to move
into markets or other less regulated domains.
A number of academics have drawn attention to this risk and have pro-
posed some creative ways to try to minimize the regulatory discrepancy. 33
Nonetheless, significant work remains to be done on the issues that arise as fi-
nancing and other activities shift out of banks and into the capital markets. This
issue is all the more pressing in light of the policy reforms that have been
adopted in recent years.
C. Policy Responses to the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis
The Dodd-Frank Act and other policy responses to the 2007-2009 financial
crisis impose a mix of reforms designed to reduce systemic risk. The majority
of the reforms adopted involve increases in the stringency or scope of estab-
lished tools for regulating systemic risk. Increases in the magnitude of capital
adequacy requirements and other changes intended to increase their efficacy are
31. GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 168
(2010).
32. Id. at 169.
33. See, e.g., John Geanakoplos, Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leve-
rage Cycle, FED. REs. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV., Aug. 2010, at 101, 104 ("[T]he best
way to monitor leverage is to do it at the security level by keeping track of haircuts on all the
different kinds of assets used as collateral, including in the repo market and in the housing
market."); Gorton & Metrick, supra note 4, at 284-89 (arguing that "[r]epos and securitiza-
tion should be regulated because they are, in effect, new forms of banking, but with the same
vulnerability as other forms of bank-created money" and proposing specific ways of doing
so).
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a centerpiece in these reforms.34 As a result, there is reason to expect that the
shadow banking system and financial innovations that enable funding activities
to be moved from banks into the capital markets will continue to grow.
At the same time, aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act and other policy res-
ponses to the crisis are responsive to concerns about the limitations of tradi-
tional approaches to regulating systemic risk and the need for a more macro-
prudential approach to systemic risk regulation. Specific provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act directly target the structure of certain markets in ways de-
signed to reduce systemic risk.35 Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act creates a new
Financial Stability Oversight Council, which will consist of the heads of the
leading financial regulators, as well as a new Office of Financial Research.
These new bodies are specifically charged with identifying and working with
other financial regulators to respond to new sources of systemic risk. Likewise,
at the international level, aspects of the new Basel III framework for banking
regulation are expressly designed to address macroprudential concerns, and a
new Financial Stability Board has been formed to work with "national financial
authorities and international standard setting bodies" to identify and respond to
sources of systemic risk arising from markets, in addition to risks arising within
large financial intuitions.3 6
As reflected in the important roles assigned to the Financial Stability Over-
sight Council, the Dodd-Frank Act serves more as a starting point than a con-
clusion in efforts to reduce systemic risk.3 Success of the responses adopted
34. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 171, 12
U.S.C. § 5371 (Supp. IV 2010) (requiring the appropriate federal banking agencies to estab-
lish minimum risk-based capital requirements and providing guidance as to how those stan-
dards should be established and implemented); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING
SYSTEMS 2 (rev. ed. 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf ("The Basel
Committee is raising the resilience of the banking sector by .. . rais[ing] both the quality and
quantity of the regulatory capital base and enhanc[ing] the risk coverage of the capital
framework.").
35. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act §§ 711-774, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-
1802 (codified in scattered sections of 7 and 15 U.S.C.) (imposing new restrictions on swap
transactions).
36. Overview, FIN. STABILITY BD., http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/
overview.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2012); see also History, FIN. STABILITY BD.,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2012);
Mandate, FIN. STABILITY BD., http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/mandate.htm
(last visited Mar. 9, 2012); cf Jaime Caruana, Gen. Manager, Bank for Int'l Settlements, The
Challenge of Taking Macroprudential Decisions: Who Will Press Which Button(s)?, Speech
at the 13th Annual International Banking Conference (Sept. 24, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.bis.org/speeches/spl00928.pdf) (describing the ways Basel III seeks to address
concems about macroprudential regulation).
37. See, e.g., DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010,
at i (2010), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b
-b870-b7cO25ed2ecf/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ld4495c7-ObeO-4e9a-ba77
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thus far depends crucially on the willingness of the new and newly empowered
regulators to use their authority to address the myriad sources of systemic risk
that were not addressed directly, and that may even be aggravated, by the other
policy reforms adopted.
The three projects just described-identifying new sources of systemic
risk, developing a macroprudential approach to systemic risk regulation, and
understanding the effects of shifting financing activities out of regulated banks
and into the capital markets-shape the case study that follows. The case study
takes as its focus the complexity that resulted from the evolution and prolifera-
tion of a particular financial innovation and the ways the resultant complexity
gave rise to two new sources of systemic risk. Underlying this focus is the ex-
pectation that financial innovation will continue and that the spread of financial
innovations will often increase the complexity of the capital markets in ways
akin to the sources of complexity which arose from the spread of MBSs and
CDOs.
This Article's key contributions arise not just from its focus but also its
methodology. By approaching these issues through a case study that begins
with the origins of the financial innovation, the descriptive account that follows
recreates the landscape as it would have appeared to regulators and market par-
ticipants involved in this area. It thereby sets the stage for a pragmatic analysis
of the sources of systemic risk that may have been visible to regulators (had
they known what they were looking for) and the steps that regulators could
have taken to address those sources of risk prior to the 2007-2009 financial
crisis. 38
II. THE EMERGENCE OF FRAGMENTATION NODES
This Part introduces the subject of the case study--CDOs backed by
MBSs. The descriptive account that follows shows that this highly complex fi-
nancial innovation was not something that anyone set out to create. Rather, it
evolved over time through a series of incremental steps. This Part also ex-
amines the nature of the complexity inherent in these innovative structures.
-f786fb90464a/070910 Financial ReformSummary.pdf ("By our count, the [Dodd-Frank]
Act requires 243 rulemakings and 67 studies.").
38. We will return in Part IV, below, to examine more closely the questions of how
broadly the findings of this case study may be applied and the likelihood that the dynamics
revealed will arise again.
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A. Mortgage-Backed Securities
1. The early days
The story of the current mortgage marketplace starts not with private banks
but with the federal government. 39 One of the many policy goals pursued by
the government in the wake of the Great Depression to improve the lives of av-
erage Americans was to increase homeownership. 40 Government programs,
such as government guarantees of certain home loans, increased the willingness
of banks to extend home loans, but many banks remained hesitant to become
overly engaged in that business. A primary reason was the risk that a home-
owner would prepay his home loan, either to move or because he had refi-
nanced. As a result of this prepayment risk, the cash flows from a single home
loan can vary dramatically, even if the principal is insured. Prepayment risk
tends to be particularly troublesome for a holder of loans that have a fixed in-
terest rate, as homeowners are most likely to refinance, and thereby repay such
loans, when interest rates are low-precisely the circumstances when the hold-
er least wants the loans to be repaid.
The government responded by continuing to explore new ways to encour-
age banks to make home loans. One of the most successful government pro-
grams, which grew and evolved over time, was the creation of government-
sponsored entities (GSEs) Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae, which
are authorized to acquire home loans and securitize them.41 The process of se-
curitizing a home loan entails the creation of a securitization vehicle, generally
a trust, to which the GSE sells a pool of home loans that it has acquired from
various banks engaged in the business of originating the loans. The trust ob-
tains the cash to acquire the home loans by simultaneously issuing securities
with certain rights to the cash flows coming from the underlying loans.42 When
a GSE sponsors a securitization, that GSE guarantees the principal on each of
39. See 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL
ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES § 2.3, at 49 (Ann Taylor Schwing ed., 2d ed.
2005).
40. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L.
REv. 2185, 2194-97 (2007) (stating that "[t]hroughout the 1930s the federal government took
a series of steps to restart and expand [the mortgage-finance and housing-construction] in-
dustries" and describing each of these initiatives).
41. While limited secondary markets for mortgages had developed as early as the thir-
teenth century, it is generally recognized that the current market for mortgage securities de-
veloped in the wake of these government programs. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 39, § 6.2, at
202-11 (describing the history and evolution of pooling mortgages).
42. While not discussed here, tax and regulatory considerations also play substantial
roles in shaping the structure of securitization vehicles.
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the loans underlying the transaction. 43 As a result, the MBS investor bears the
prepayment risk, but the GSE bears the default risk.4
The first GSE-sponsored securitizations were pass-throughs. A pass-
through structure provides each investor holding an MBS issued in the transac-
tion a pro rata share of the interest and principal payments made on each of the
home loans underlying the transaction. 45 In terms of securitization structure,
these transactions are relatively simple. The cash flows coming in mirror the
cash flows going out, and each investor holds an equivalent set of rights with
respect to those cash flows. The GSE guarantee adds to the relative simplicity
of the transaction by effectively eliminating the need for an investor to evaluate
the credit risk inherent in the underlying loans and by giving a single entity an
incentive to maximize the value of each loan in the event complications arise.
The insight at the core of securitization is that the party in the best position
to originate a home loan (traditionally, a local bank) may not be in the best po-
sition to hold the risks and expected returns on that loan. Separating the two
roles allows each to be played by the party best suited to that role. 46 While se-
parating these roles may create value, it also creates a number of logistical chal-
lenges. One is the need to ensure that the originating bank remains diligent in
determining whether to extend a particular home loan even when it is not di-
rectly exposed to its subsequent performance. The primary legal mechanism
used to address this moral hazard is the purchase agreement, in which the origi-
nating bank makes numerous representations and warranties regarding the qual-
ity of the home loans being transferred and the processes employed by the bank
in determining whether to extend each of the loans.
A second logistical challenge arising from the separation of origination and
ownership was the need to have someone who could service the home loans. A
home loan traditionally created an ongoing relationship between the bank that
originated the loan and the borrower. It was to the bank that the borrower made
43. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND THE HOUSING GSEs 9 (2001) (de-
scribing the way "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ... effectively provide a guarantee of timely
payment on MBSs" they issue).
44. Investors were still exposed to credit risk in that the GSE sponsoring the transac-
tion may not have been financially capable of fulfilling its guarantee, but it was long as-
sumed (and subsequently confirmed) that the U.S. government would never allow the GSEs
to default. See, e.g., JANET M. TAVAKOLI, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND COLLATERALIZED DEBT
OBLIGATIONS: NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN CASH AND SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION 126-27 (2d ed.
2008).
45. See Frederick C. Dunbar et al., CDOs: Structure, Value and Causation Circa
2007, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION IN THE MARKET MELTDOWN ERA: ACHIEVING FAIRNESS IN
PERCEPTION AND REALITY 119, 123 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No.
18,567, 1990); Brent J. Horton, In Defense ofPrivate-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61
FLA. L. REv. 827, 836 n.45 (2009).
46. This is just one source of value creation arising from securitization. Another is di-
versification. Grouping together a pool of home loans reduces the cash flow variability, and
may also be used to reduce the holder's exposure to other risk factors, such as conditions
specific to a geographic region, through diversification.
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his monthly payments, it was to the bank the borrower turned in the event of
changed circumstances that might require the terms of the loans to be revisited,
and it was the bank that would foreclose and resell the home if the borrower
defaulted. In order to meet this challenge, securitization vehicles retain a "ser-
vicer," a party that specializes in servicing home loans, charged with these
tasks.47
GSE-sponsored pass-throughs were an important advance in the mortgage
market and remain a central fixture in that market today.48 They provided a
new option for investors and expanded dramatically the types of investors from
whom capital for home loans could be obtained. Financial intermediaries rec-
ognized, however, that the market for mortgage securities could yet be ex-
panded. One way financial intermediaries sought to expand the market was to
increase the pool of investors to whom mortgage securities could be sold.49 Be-
cause of prepayment risk, the stream of cash flows from a GSE pass-through
could vary dramatically, making them ill-suited for many investors. If financial
intermediaries could create securities offering more predictable cash flows and
accommodate other needs of heterogeneous investors, the range of investors to
whom mortgage securities could be sold could be increased dramatically. One
response was the formation of securitization transactions backed by pools of
GSE pass-throughs, rather than home loans, against which multiple tranches of
securities were issued.50 Each tranche was given a different set of rights to the
cash flows from the underlying pass-throughs.
A second way financial intermediaries sought to meet the needs of diverse
investors and to expand the market for mortgage securities was to increase the
range of home loans that could be securitized. GSEs can only acquire and secu-
ritize loans that meet a number of criteria, including limitations on the duration
of the loan, the ratio of the amount of the loan relative to the value of the home,
and the absolute amount of the loan. Loans that do not meet all of these criteria,
47. Core to making these transactions work is the fact that investors have rights to the
cash flows coming from the mortgages but no direct stake in the mortgages themselves. This
is critical because there are special limitations placed upon the ways in which real property
interests may be divided and special policy issues that arise when interests in real property
become too fragmented or are divided in nonstandardized ways. See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER,
THE GRIDLOCK EcoNoMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS
INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1
(2000).
48. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 44, at 126-28.
49. While under the idealized conditions postulated by Modigliani and Miller, this
type of development would not have produced any net benefits, the reality of the financial
marketplace strays far from that idealized world. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. White-
head, Essay, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital
Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 247-51 (2008).
50. These transactions are generally referred to as collateralized mortgage obligations
and continue to have a significant place in the market for mortgage securities. See Dunbar et
al., supra note 45, at 123.
672 [Vol. 64:657
FRA GMENTA TION NODES
such as jumbo loans, which are greater in amount than those a GSE is allowed
to acquire, could not be sold to a GSE. In response, financial intermediaries
created private-label MBSs, privately sponsored MBS transactions backed by
home loans that do not conform to the GSE criteria.
2. Private-label MBSs
The first private-label MBS was issued by Bank of America in 1977. The
federal government enacted legislation facilitating the issuance of private-label
MBSs in 1984,51 and the market for these securities expanded rapidly thereaf-
ter. Because home loans packaged into a private-label MBS are not guaranteed
by a GSE, private-label MBSs pose credit risk in addition to prepayment risk.
This was in some ways a significant development, giving rise to the need for
the terms of the MBS to allocate credit risk in addition to prepayment risk. Yet,
the magnitude of this credit risk was perceived to be small, both because of
homeowner reluctance to default and the expectation that a significant portion
of the value of a loan could be recovered through foreclosure even if a home-
owner did default.
Both credit risk and prepayment risk are allocated among the different
tranches of MBSs issued through "waterfall" provisions that set forth the rights
of each of the different tranches. The general idea is to create a hierarchical
structure in which losses on the underlying loans are allocated first to the sub-
ordinate tranches. This enables the creation of senior tranches that have very
little credit risk. The processes through which these structures are created are
not, however, as simple as the rationale for them.
While the terms of a securitization are static, the cash flows coming into a
securitization vehicle are not. Each time a borrower misses a monthly payment,
makes a double payment to accelerate the rate at which she pays down her loan,
refinances, or defaults, the amount of cash coming into the securitization ve-
hicle is affected. How these events influence the cash paid out of the securitiza-
tion vehicle to the various tranches depends upon the terms of that particular
transaction. These are just a few of the series of decisions the financial inter-
mediary sponsoring an MBS must make at the time the transaction is put to-
gether. The sponsor must also decide what home loans to include in the MBS,
the terms on which those loans will be acquired from the originators, how many
different tranches of MBSs to issue, the size of each of those tranches, the in-
terest rate that should be paid to each of those tranches, and so on. There is no
cookie cutter that can be used to create these transactions.
51. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 (SMMEA), Pub. L. No.
98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.); see also Edward
L. Pittman, Economic and Regulatory Developments Affecting Mortgage Related Securities,
64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 497, 497 (1989) (explaining the changes effectuated by SMMEA
and noting that following its adoption, "the market for mortgage securities ... increased
dramatically").
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The range of options available to a financial intermediary sponsoring an
MBS transaction is reflected in the variety of different mechanisms a sponsor
may use to credit-enhance the senior tranches issued by that MBS. As just de-
scribed, the primary means of credit enhancement is the use of a multitranche
subordination structure. Typically, all of the losses on the underlying home
loans are allocated first to the most junior (or "equity") tranche, which for this
reason is often referred to as the "first-loss" piece. If and when that tranche is
wiped out, the second most junior tranche begins absorbing the losses, and the
pattern repeats as needed.52 While this type of rule is regularly used to allocate
losses, there is no comparable uniform rule that must be used to allocate prin-
cipal payments among the different tranches.
If a sponsor wants to minimize the credit risk to which the senior tranche is
exposed, the sponsor can use a sequential amortization scheme. In that case,
one hundred percent of the principal payments made on any of the underlying
loans, including prepayments, are paid out to the most senior tranche of MBS
outstanding until that tranche is repaid in full. At that time, the process repeats
with all principal repaid going to the most senior tranche still outstanding.
While such an approach minimizes credit risk, there are also drawbacks to us-
ing a strictly sequential waterfall. Because the rate at which the senior tranche
will be repaid increases as prepayments increase, this type of waterfall exposes
the senior tranche to significant prepayment risk. The terms of the more junior
tranches of MBSs that result from this type of structure also may not be well
suited to the needs of investors otherwise in a position to bear the additional
credit risk posed by those tranches. Thus, while many MBS transactions con-
tinued to use this type of waterfall, financial intermediaries also experimented
with an array of other mechanisms for distributing principal payments. 53
The waterfall provisions may, for example, provide that the most senior
tranche receives all of the principal payments until the earlier of a specified
point in time (e.g., five years from the date of issuance) or the satisfaction of
specified performance metrics. Once the enumerated condition is satisfied, the
principal ceases to be distributed sequentially and is instead distributed pro rata
among all of the tranches of MBSs still outstanding based upon the principal
value of the MBSs.54 The performance metrics are designed to ensure that the
amount of credit enhancement in the securitization vehicle makes it probable
that the shift to the pro rata allocation of principal will not expose the senior
52. The junior tranches are compensated for the additional credit risk to which they are
exposed through a higher interest rate.
53. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 39, § 8.3.4, at 365 (describing pay-through MBS struc-
tures designed to offer "planned amortization class bonds" and "targeted amortization class
bonds").
54. Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic 10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 14,398, 2008).
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tranches to too much credit risk.55 In addition to being used as a trigger for
shifting from a sequential to a pro rata amortization scheme, different perfor-
mance metrics-ones indicating that the loans underlying a transaction are per-
forming below expectations-may be used to cut off interest payments to sub-
ordinate tranches even before the aggregate losses have wiped out those
tranches.
In addition to determining the bundle of cash flow rights that should be
given to each of the tranches, a transaction sponsor may also create tranches
with rights that fall outside this prioritized hierarchy. Common alternatives in-
clude interest-only and principal-only tranches, which have terms consistent
with their names. By parsing more finely the type of risk to which the holder is
exposed, these types of MBSs may be used by investors as hedges against other
risks to which they may be exposed or as bets upon market movements. 56 In-
terest-only MBSs, for example, generally have no credit risk but substantial
prepayment risk, so may be attractive to an investor who believes that interest
rates are likely to increase and thus that prepayment speeds will be slower than
the market anticipates (assuming that the loans underlying the transaction have
fixed, rather than variable, interest rates).
In conjunction with the structures described above, a variety of additional
mechanisms may be used to provide further credit enhancement to the senior
tranches. Some of these mechanisms are external to the securitization vehicle,
such as letters of credit, guarantees, or insurance policies covering a portion of
the MBSs issued. For example, it became common prior to the financial crisis
for all or a portion of the AAA-rated securities issued in a transaction to be in-
sured by a AAA-rated insurance company.59 So long as the amount paid for
this insurance policy was less than the savings realized in the form of the lower
interest rate that could be paid on the MBSs protected by the insurance, these
policies made economic sense from the perspective of the transaction sponsor.
Other mechanisms for providing credit enhancement are endogenous to the
securitization vehicle. The two most commonly used mechanisms are excess
55. These metrics may include limitations on the aggregate value of defaults on the
underlying pool of mortgages and the proportion of outstanding loans that are delinquent as
of the measurement date. Id.
56. 1 FRANKEL, supra note 39, § 8.3.5, at 367 (describing securitization structures pro-
viding for interest-only and principal-only securities, and noting the ways each may be used
to hedge different interest rate risks).
57. See, e.g., REDWOOD TRUST, THE REDWOOD REVIEw 2ND QUARTER 2009, at 43
(2009) (describing a particular interest-only MBS investment, including risks and expected
returns).
58. See generally 1 FRANKEL, supra note 39, §§ 9.2-9.6, at 360-70.
59. Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA
L. REv. 183, 201 (2009).
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spread and overcollateralization. 60 Excess spread arises when the cash flows
coming into the securitization vehicle from the underlying home loans are
greater than the amount of cash being paid out, including fees and interest
payments to MBS holders (but excluding, in both directions, cash flows charac-
terized as principal). 6' Overcollateralization arises when the face value of the
assets (the underlying home loans) in a securitization vehicle exceed the face
value of the MBSs issued by that vehicle. 62
As this abbreviated introduction to MBS structures reflects, innovation
within the field of mortgage securitization provided transaction sponsors with
an almost endless array of spigots they could use in constructing the "waterfall"
which determines when cash from the underlying home loans is paid out to
each of the tranches of securities issued. By allowing transaction sponsors to
partition risk more finely, and package that risk in different forms, these inno-
vations enabled sponsors to create securities particularly suited to the indivi-
dualized needs of different investors. At the same time, the use of multitranche
structures and other credit-enhancement mechanisms increased the complexity
of securitization structures and transformed the relationship between the inves-
tor and the assets underlying its investment. In contrast to a pass-through, the
economic interest of an MBS investor in a loan underlying his investment is not
fixed, but rather is dynamic and contingent on the performance of the other
loans with which that loan is bundled and on the waterfall pursuant to which
the cash flows from the loans are allocated among the various tranches.
To highlight that something new is created that permanently transforms the
relationship between the underlying asset and the investors with economic
rights to the cash flows from that asset, this Article introduces the term "frag-
mentation node" for the structure that is formed.63 The term is a theoretical
construct for the rights, responsibilities, and constraints set forth in all of the
agreements entered into when a multitranche securitization transaction is con-
summated. It applies to all private-label MBSs and to the CDO transaction
structures described below.
Notably, once a fragmentation node is put into place, it cannot be removed.
As a result, a home loan, which started as a bilateral arrangement between two
parties, becomes embedded in a complex web of arrangements which may
60. See Gary Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitiza-
tion, in THE RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 549, 564 (Mark Carey & Rend M. Stulz eds.,
2006).
61. See id
62. See GORTON, supra note 31, at 98-99; Gorton & Souleles, supra note 60, at 560.
63. The term "node" has also been used in the growing body of literature examining
network effects, which is starting to be applied to financial networks. The use of the term
here complements-but is analytically distinct from-its use in that literature, as the qualifi-
er "fragmentation" draws attention to what happens inside the node. See, e.g., Ross A.
Hammond, Systemic Risk in the Financial System: Insights from Network Science 2 (Pew
Fin. Reform Project, Briefing Paper No. 12, 2009).
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grant tens or even hundreds of investors an economic stake in that loan. By
shifting attention away from the securitization transaction which creates these
varied interests, and toward the landscape of the capital market post-
transaction, the term "fragmentation node" facilitates consideration of the sys-
temic consequences associated with the proliferation of these transactions. In
light of the possibility for transactions in the aggregate to have systemic effects
which are qualitatively different from the localized effects of any individual
transaction, the ability to shift between analyzing the localized and systemic
effects of this financial innovation is critical to developing a more complete
understanding of the ramifications of its spread.
B. Toward More Complex Structures
This Subpart describes some of the innovations and market forces that
shaped the growth of the mortgage-security market in the years leading up to
the financial crisis. It explains why subprime MBSs-a particular type of
MBS-and CDOs backed by MBSs proliferated rapidly during this period. It
also describes key features of these transaction structures.
1. Another type of innovation
The preceding Part described myriad innovations enabling transaction
sponsors to modify the terms of a securitization transaction to suit investor
needs and to enable a broader array of home loan types to be packaged into
fragmentation nodes. At the same time, another type of innovation was simul-
taneously contributing to the growth of the market for mortgage securities. This
group of innovations included new techniques for modeling MBSs and related
transactions, as well as the development of other tools facilitating the ability of
financial intermediaries sponsoring securitization transactions, credit agencies
rating them, and potential investors evaluating them to assess more easily the
expected returns on the securities issued.
For example, one challenge in assessing the value of a security issued in a
multitranche securitization transaction is that its value depends not only on the
quality of the underlying assets and the terms of the waterfall, but also on the
correlation among the performance of the underlying assets. If all of the under-
lying assets are likely to succeed or fail at the same time, the securitization
structure does not enable the type of diversification which is key to reducing
the likelihood that the senior tranche of securities issued will fail to perform. 64
A paper published by David Li in 2000 described a device, known as a "Gaus-
sian copula," which could be used to reduce dramatically the effort required to
64. See Dunbar et al., supra note 45, at 137-39.
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evaluate the relationships among the default risks of the assets in certain securi-
tization transactions.65
Li's Gaussian copula enabled market participants to use a single number to
capture the effect of these relationships among the underlying assets for each
tranche of securities issued in a CDO, subject to certain assumptions and the
availability of relevant data.66 This radically reduced the effort required to eva-
luate the expected default rate and return on the securities issued. Views differ
on the extent to which market participants understood the limitations inherent
in this device.67 There is little disagreement, however, on how widely used it
became, and how critical its use was in enabling the growth of the MBS and
CDO markets.6 8 Other similar innovations and improvements in modeling
techniques also played important roles in enabling the creation of even more
complex fragmentation nodes.69
2. Market forces
In light of the myriad mechanisms MBS and CDO sponsors could build in-
to waterfalls and the new tools available to them to assess the expected perfor-
mance of the various securities issued, the primary factors shaping the growth
of the MBS and subsequently CDO markets became market forces-the types
of home loans available to be securitized and the willingness of investors to ac-
quire the securities issued.
65. Felix Salmon, Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street, WIRED,
Feb. 23, 2009, at 419, 419, available at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-03/wp
quant?currentPage=all (explaining that in the years immediately following its publication,
"Li's formula, known as a Gaussian copula function, looked like an unambiguously positive
breakthrough, a piece of financial technology that allowed hugely complex risks to be mod-
eled with more ease and accuracy than ever before").
66. See Damiano Brigo et al., Credit Models and the Crisis: Default Cluster Dynamics
and the Generalized Poisson Loss Model, 6 J. CREDIT RISK 39 (2010).
67. See DAMIANO BRIGO ET AL., CREDIT MODELS AND THE CRISIs, at xiv-xv (2010)
(stating that "quant and academic communities . . . produced and witnessed a large body of
research questioning the copula assumption" even prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis,
while recognizing that many popular media accounts of the crisis have suggested otherwise).
68. See Donald MacKenzie, The Credit Crisis as a Problem in the Sociology ofKnow-
ledge, 116 AM. J. Soc. 1778, 1803 (2011) (describing the adoption and spread of Li's Gaus-
sian copula); Sam Jones, Of Couples and Copulas, FT WEEKEND MAG., Apr. 25, 2009, at 30
(explaining the critical role played by Li's Gaussian copula in the growth of structured
finance and how it led to "CDOs built solely out of subprime mortgage debt bec[oming] the
rage"); Salmon, supra note 65, at 419 (explaining that Li's Gaussian copula function "was
adopted by everybody from bond investors and Wall Street banks to ratings agencies and
regulators," enabling "traders to sell vast quantities of new securities, expanding financial
markets to unimaginable levels").
69. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 72 (2011)
("As private-label securitization began to take hold, new computer and modeling technolo-
gies were reshaping the mortgage market.").
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Of these, perhaps the most significant was the strong investor demand for
financial instruments with a AAA rating. 70 Because MBSs backed by subprime
loans and CDOs backed in part by MBSs tended to offer particularly high
yields relative to their rating, there was a particularly strong demand for these
securities.7 1 This demand transformed the marketplace, both directly and indi-
rectly, as financial intermediaries sponsoring these transactions became increa-
singly creative in finding ways to feed this demand.72
One response of financial intermediaries sponsoring these transactions was
to increase the rate at which they acquired loans, particularly subprime loans,
which in turn influenced the rate at which originators extended such loans. On-
ly six percent of the home loans originated in 2002 were subprime, compared
with more than twenty percent by 2006.73 Of the roughly $1.2 trillion in sub-
prime loans extended in 2005-2006, more than eighty percent were subsequent-
ly packaged into securitization transactions.74 A second, closely related trend
was the growth of the CDO market. As one source noted, "Although CDOs
have existed since 1987, the market experienced significant growth during the
period from 2000 to 2006. In 2004, there was approximately $157.4 billion in
global CDO issuance. In 2006, there was $551.7 billion in issuance, a growth
of approximately 250%."75
These two trends are closely linked because CDOs were among the prima-
ry buyers of MBSs backed by subprime home loans, particularly the lower in-
vestment-grade tranches.76 Because these tranches traditionally had been
among the most difficult to sell, this demand led to a feedback loop with a par-
ticularly pronounced effect in the subprime area, in which CDOs and MBSs
transactions proliferated in tandem.77 In light of the importance of subprime
MBSs and CDOs to the market for mortgage securities in the years leading into
the 2007-2009 financial crisis, each is addressed below.
70. See Buttonwood: Not What They Meant, ECoNoMIsT, Jan. 30, 2010, at 82 (explain-
ing how the "Basel rules, designed to ensure that banks have enough capital to cope with
economic crises, . . . created an incentive for banks to hold AAA-rated securities"); Ben S.
Bernanke et al., International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United
States, 2003-2007, at 7-13 (Bd. Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., Int'l Fin. Discussion Paper
No. 1014, 2011).
71. See RAJAN, supra note 19, at 135.
72. See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Finan-
cial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 33 (2009); Bernanke et al., supra note 70, at 13-15.
73. Subprime Lending: Rising Damp, ECONOMIsT, Mar. 10, 2007, at 69.
74. See Gorton, supra note 54, at 6.
75. Faten Sabry & Chudozie Okongwu, How Did We Get Here? The Story of the Cre-
dit Crisis, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Spring 2009, at 53, 61.
76. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 69, at 128-30 (explaining how
"CDOs [became] the dominant buyers of the BBB-rated tranches of mortgage-backed securi-
ties" and the effects of this shift).
77. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, RESPONDING TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND
MEASURING SYSTEMIC RISK 87 (2009); Dunbar et al., supra note 45, at 126; MacKenzie, su-
pra note 68, at 1822-23.
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3. Subprime MBSs
While the process of constructing an MBS backed by traditional home
loans requires a notable degree of customization, the process becomes signifi-
cantly more complicated as the complexity of the underlying loans increases. In
part because of the additional credit risk associated with home loans extended
to borrowers with poor credit histories, the defining characteristic of subprime
loans, such loans often have a number of complicating features. Subprime loans
are often structured as hybrid loans, with a low, fixed interest rate for the first
two or three years (a "teaser" rate), and a higher variable interest rate there-
after.7 8 As a result, subprime borrowers often have a strong incentive to try to
refinance after only two or three years. The tendency for many subprime home
loans to be refinanced within a few years of origination shaped the terms of the
securitization vehicles into which they were packaged. As described by Gary
Gorton:
Subprime securitizations are very different from standard securitizations
because the refinancing of the underlying subprime mortgages provides the
securitization with a lot of cash, which can be used to build-up credit en-
hancement over time. It does this by storing cash in the securitization and by
amortization, which builds up the lower-rated tranches' thickness over time.
But, this dynamic credit enhancement depends on the subprime mortgages re-
financing.
Thus, the performance of MBSs backed by subprime loans depends upon the
ability of each homeowner to refinance and prepay in full his current loan. A
homeowner's ability to do so depends, in turn, on the value of the home at the
time he seeks to refinance, as well as prevailing credit conditions. 80 As a result,
the performance of subprime loans and MBSs backed by subprime loans are
much more sensitive to the housing market than more traditional home loans
and MBSs.
A related effect is that subprime MBSs tend to be far more complex than
other private-label MBSs. Balancing the need to provide the senior tranches
with sufficient credit enhancement to warrant a high rating from a credit rating
agency with the need to provide adequate expected returns to attract buyers to
the more junior tranches-while also creating a structure that can absorb the
expected onslaught of early prepayments-requires complicated mechanisms to
be built into the waterfall provisions of each transaction. As a result, the water-
fall provisions of a subprime MBS typically contained myriad triggers relating
78. Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569 (July 10,
2007); Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Con-
tracts, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1073, 1076 (2009).
79. Gorton, supra note 54, at 12.
80. The likelihood a subprime mortgagor who cannot refinance will default, and the
likelihood that the default will result in a loss to the holder of the loan, are also increased by
another common feature of subprime mortgages-the down payment is often low or non-
existent. Bar-Gill, supra note 78, at 1076.
[Vol. 64:657680
FRAGMENTATION NODES
to the age of the securitization vehicle, the amount of overcollateralization, and
other performance metrics.81
The intricacy of these waterfall provisions highlights the complexity of the
deal struck among the holders of the different tranches of an MBS regarding
the rights of each tranche to cash flows coming from the underlying home
loans. As in other private-label MBSs, the deal struck is not that the holders of
the most senior tranche always win out over the holders of other tranches no
matter what the cost or effect on those tranches. Rather, the most senior tranche
has priority over the other tranches only to the extent set forth in the terms of
that particular MBS. This finely tuned allocation of rights is key to the success
of securitization, for the protections provided to the more junior tranches are
key to attracting investors willing to acquire those securities.
4. CDOs and beyond
CDOs are securitization transactions, like MBSs, but may be backed by a
range of different debt instruments.82 At issue here are CDOs backed exclu-
sively or in significant part by MBSs. The process of creating such a CDO is
similar to the process of creating an MBS. A securitization vehicle is formed
that acquires cash-producing assets with capital it receives from issuing mul-
tiple tranches of securities. Cash flows, in the form of interest and principal
from the underlying assets, come into the securitization vehicle. That cash is
then paid out to investors or retained in the vehicle pursuant to detailed water-
fall provisions put into place when the transaction is consummated. Because the
assets underlying a CDO are more diverse and complex than the home loans
underlying an MBS, the process of compiling assets and designing waterfalls to
determine when interest and principal are to be paid to investors is often even
more complex than the process described above. Moreover, just as with MBS
transactions, those terms are customized to each transaction.
81. See Gorton, supra note 54, at 10-12.
82. TAVAKOLI, supra note 44, at 117. This Article also takes the position that, for re-
levant purposes, CDOs should not be seen as analogous to actively managed financial insti-
tutions. The critical distinction-the lack of active management at the level of the node-is
pivotal with respect to each of the phenomena identified in Part III. Cf Markus K. Brunner-
meier & Martin Oehmke, Complexity in Financial Markets 5 (Sept. 10, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-markus/research/papers/Complexity
.pdf ("If one were to value Goldman Sachs 'bottom-up', i.e. by considering each of Goldman
Sachs's businesses, their positions, projected cash flows and their risk profile, the resulting
exercise would likely be at least as complex as coming up with a price for the tranche of a
CDO.").
83. See Gorton, supra note 54, at 14 ("There is no standardization of triggers across
CDOs. Some have sequential cash flow triggers, others do not. Some have [overcollaterali-
zation] trigger calculations based on ratings changes; others do not. There is no straightfor-
ward template.").
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Another important difference between MBSs and CDOs in practice was the
mode of distribution. While many MBSs were distributed through public offer-
ings, CDOs were generally distributed through private placements pursuant to
an exemption that enables the securities issued to be resold even if they have
not been registered pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933.8 One criterion to
qualify for this exemption is that all of the investors to whom the securities are
offered must be qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). QIBs are generally re-
quired to have at least $100 million in investable assets.85 As a result, CDO in-
vestors were almost exclusively institutional investors with substantial assets
and resources who were presumed under applicable securities laws to be capa-
ble of looking out for themselves.
Despite their complexity, CDOs comprised of other securitized assets, like
MBSs, were not the end of the story. Financial intermediaries continued to add
additional fragmentation nodes along the same chain, forming so-called CDOs
squared (CDOs 2), which included CDO securities among their assets, and even
CDOs cubed (CDOs 3). The main rationale underlying these transactions was
the same as that underlying the creation of CDOs-because the price differen-
tial between highly rated structured products and lower-rated structured prod-
ucts was greater than was justified by differences in their assessed credit risk,
transforming lower-rated securities into higher-rated ones could create value. 86
Another major area of innovation was the introduction of hybrid and syn-
thetic CDOs. Synthetic CDOs are backed by a pool of credit default swaps refe-
rencing MBSs or other assets, rather than actual cash-producing assets.8 ' Credit
default swaps are bilateral agreements which require each party to the agree-
ment to make payments to the other depending upon the performance of an
agreed-upon reference security. The swaps underlying synthetic CDOs were
designed to mimic the performance of reference MBSs or other debt instru-
ments. Because each swap was a bilateral agreement, for a synthetic CDO to
take a long position (effectively betting that home loans would continue to per-
form), there had to be an investor willing to take the short position (betting that
home loans would underperform relative to market expectations). Synthetic
CDOs, accordingly, served two markets simultaneously. The synthetic CDOs
satisfied the market demand for mortgage securities while investors who
wanted to short the mortgage market (because they believed that the market
84. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2009).
85. See id; see also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A Equity Offer-
ings, 56 UCLA L. REv. 409, 426 (2008).
86. A notable flaw in this reasoning is that not all credit risk is equal. Even if a AAA-
rated CDO and a AAA-rated corporate bond have the same expected default rate, the corpo-
rate bond poses relatively more idiosyncratic risk and should, accordingly, be more highly
valued by investors who can reduce their exposure to that risk through diversification. See
Joshua D. Coval et al., Economic Catastrophe Bonds, 99 AM. EcoN. REv. 628 (2009).
87. Because synthetic CDOs are not the focus of this Article, what is provided is a
simplified and somewhat stylized account of how synthetic CDOs work.
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was overpriced or to hedge against other investments they held) could do so by
acting as a counterparty to one or more of the underlying swaps. A related
product, the hybrid CDO, is backed by a combination of cash-producing assets
and credit default swaps. An extensive analysis of the growth of these markets
and the distinct issues presented by these transactions is outside the scope of
this Article. It suffices to note that each was yet another example of an innova-
tion that built off a framework that had already gained acceptance in the
marketplace.
An example of how the developments just described translated into prac-
tice is provided by Kenneth Scott and John Taylor based on their examination
of the details of several CDOs. They found:
One example is a . . . CDO 2 created by a large bank in 2005. It had 173 in-
vestments in tranches issued by other pools: 130 CDOs, and also 43 [collatera-
lized loan obligations] each composed of hundreds of corporate loans. It is-
sued $975 million of four AAA tranches, and three subordinate tranches of
$55 million. The AAA tranches were bought by banks and the subordinate
tranches mostly by hedge funds.
Two of the 173 investments held by this CDO 2 were in tranches from
another billion-dollar CDO--created by another bank earlier in 2005-which
was composed mainly of 155 MBS tranches and 40 CDOs. Two of these 155
MBS tranches were from a $1 billion [residential-]MBS pool created in 2004
by a large investment bank, composed of almost 7,000 mortgage loans (90%
subprime).88
This example illustrates the extent of fragmentation, the level of complexi-
ty inherent in these transactions, and the tendency for each of these effects to
compound with the addition of each serial fragmentation node. The degree of
fragmentation becomes evident by taking the perspective of one of the seven
thousand subprime borrowers. His loan was pooled with seven thousand other
home loans in a highly complex MBS structure, which likely used overcollate-
ralization and other dynamic credit-enhancement mechanisms. As a result, the
rights of any MBS holder to the interest and principal that homeowner is pay-
ing depends in part on whether the seven thousand other homeowners are mak-
ing their payments on time. Moreover, some of the securities issued in that
MBS transaction went through a second fragmentation node-the billion-dollar
CDO created by another bank earlier in 2005-at which stage, the cash flows
from those MBSs were pooled with cash flows from 154 other MBS tranches
and 40 CDOs, and then allocated according to another complicated waterfall.
Then, some of the securities issued in that transaction went through yet another
fragmentation node-the CDO 2 described-at which stage, the cash flows
(which still include payments made by the original subprime homeowner) were
pooled with cash from 130 CDOs and 43 collateralized loan obligations and
then allocated among the various tranches issued in that CDO 2 pursuant to yet
88. Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor, Op-Ed., Why Toxic Assets Are So Hard to
Clean Up, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009, at A13.
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another complicated waterfall. To identify, much less gather together, all of the
persons with an economic stake in that home loan would be a nearly impossible
feat. At the same time, from the perspective of an investor in the CDO 2, he has
only a minor stake in the performance of that particular loan, and now has lay-
ers upon layers of additional information regarding the structure of the CDO 2,
the structure of the other securitization vehicles issuing securities packaged into
the CDO 2, and the almost countless assets underlying all of those transactions,
all of which are also relevant to the performance of his investment.
C. A Changed Landscape
The previous Subpart provided a brief account of the mortgage securities
landscape just prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the key market forces
shaping the development of that landscape. This Subpart completes the ac-
count. Because the term "complexity" is often invoked, accurately but unhelp-
fully, to describe a wide array of different transactions and effects, developing a
more nuanced understanding of the nature of the complexity at issue is critical
to enabling a meaningful analysis of its effects. This Subpart begins by identi-
fying four specific sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes. It
then considers the processes through which fragmentation nodes evolved and
spread. Finally, it complicates the account told thus far by acknowledging the
many forces that may have influenced the evolution and proliferation of frag-
mentation nodes but that do not create value even on a localized basis.
1. Understanding the complexity
Taking a step back, we can see that additional complexity was introduced
at each of the stages in the evolution of mortgage securities described above.
Four specific sources of complexity inherent in all fragmentation nodes merit
particular attention.
The first is fragmentation. Each of the securitization transactions described
above creates fragmented economic rights with respect to the assets underlying
that securitization. As a result, each MBS or CDO investor generally has only a
small economic stake in the performance of any particular asset underlying that
investment. The magnitude of this reduction compounds with each additional
fragmentation node that is added to the chain connecting the home loan to the
ultimate investor. A simple example illustrates: If the holder of an MBS has a
5% interest in the cash flows coming from a particular loan, and that holder is
itself a CDO which grants each of its investors a 5% stake in the cash flows
coming into that CDO securitization vehicle, each CDO investor would have an
economic stake of only 5% of 5%, or 0.25%, in the performance of each under-
lying loan.
This hypothetical, of course, obscures the effect of having different
tranches. The creation of prioritized claims in the form of tranches, each hold-
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ing a different set of rights with respect to the cash flows coming from the un-
derlying assets, enables the creation of securities with less credit risk than the
assets underlying a securitization transaction. Multitranche structures also ena-
ble the creation of securities with very specific characteristics. Because of in-
vestor heterogeneity, this customization has the potential to increase the effi-
ciency of the capital markets and lower the cost of capital to those in need of it.
At the same time, by giving different investors different sets of rights, these
structures give rise to a variety of challenges.
Hence, a second source of complexity arising from multitranche structures
is the dynamic and contingent nature of the economic interest held by an MBS
or CDO investor with respect to the performance of any particular asset under-
lying its investment. Because of credit enhancement, the nonperformance of an
underlying asset, be it a mortgage or MBS, may have no effect on the cash
flows paid to holders of a senior tranche issued in a securitization. The amount
of credit enhancement supporting that senior tranche will decrease each time an
asset fails to perform in accordance with its terms, but whether that failure ad-
versely affects the cash paid to holders of that senior tranche depends upon the
performance of the other assets underlying that transaction.
A third, closely related source of complexity is the creation of divergent,
and potentially competitive, economic interests with respect to the performance
of any particular asset. A latent competitive tendency is inherent in any multi-
tranche structure when the triggers in the waterfall that determine the rights of
each tranche to the cash coming into the securitization vehicle are fixed by ref-
erence to the original terms of the underlying cash-producing assets. When an
asset is placed into such a securitization vehicle, there is no longer one holder
with a direct interest in maximizing the value of that asset, or even a group of
holders, each with fractional but equivalent economic stakes; rather, there are
multiple holders, each of which may be differently affected depending upon
how the terms of the asset are modified. As a result, if a situation arises that
was not contemplated at the time the underlying asset was created, different in-
vestors may be expected to have divergent preferences regarding the appropri-
ate response.
The fourth and final source of complexity is simply the lengthening of the
chain separating the original cash producing asset (the home loan) and the ulti-
mate investor with economic rights to the cash flows coming from that asset.
The addition of serial fragmentation nodes in the chain separating those two
ends may have a particularly pernicious effect on the ability of a person sitting
at one end to see through to or effect changes at the other end as a result of each
of the other sources of complexity just described. But, even without the addi-
tional challenges created by fragmentation nodes specifically, the lengthening
of the chain may in itself contribute to reduced visibility and other issues. 89
89. See Hu & Black, supra note 7, at 691 ("The longer the ownership chain ... the
greater the potential for agency costs and valuation errors to creep in.").
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Drawing attention to the specific sources of complexity inherent in frag-
mentation nodes enables a more precise analysis of the effects of that complexi-
ty, including the mechanisms through which that complexity contributes to sys-
temic risk. This discussion also lays the groundwork for determining whether
other financial innovations identified as complex are likely to produce similar
effects, thus meriting the attention of regulators concerned about systemic risk.
2. The process offinancial innovation
The preceding descriptive account also provided an overview of the
processes through which fragmentation nodes came to be, evolved in form, and
proliferated. These processes are informative both as they relate to fragmenta-
tion nodes and as illustrative of the ways in which financial innovations arise,
evolve, and spread more generally. Again, a couple of patterns merit attention.
One is that the growth of complexity occurred along two axes. The first
axis relates to the complexity of the individual transaction structures and the
securities created by those transactions. The second axis relates to the spread of
fragmentation nodes arising from the consummation of those transactions. The
proliferation of fragmentation nodes altered the landscape of the capital mar-
kets, increasing the markets' complexity in ways not captured by the heigh-
tened complexity of any particular transaction. As a result, as we will explore
further in the next Subpart, when a financial innovation becomes sufficiently
pervasive, the resultant complexity may have systemic consequences which are
qualitatively different from the localized effects of any individual transaction.
A second pattern revealed in the preceding account is that complexity in-
creased along each of these axes in an incremental fashion. Had a financial in-
2termediary tried to sell the securities issued by the complex CDOS described
by Scott and Taylor to investors with no familiarity with mortgage securities, it
almost assuredly would not have found any buyers. But the financial interme-
diary sponsoring that transaction did not create it out of whole cloth-it used
features to which investors had become accustomed incrementally over time.
Looking back, we can see that financial intermediaries, investors, and regula-
tors became accustomed first to pass-throughs, then simple private-label MBSs,
then more complex MBSs, then subprime MBSs, and so on.
The incremental nature of this evolution was key to enabling the complexi-
ty that developed. An investor accustomed to investing in pass-throughs who is
then presented with a private-label MBS, for example, may not have questioned
whether using a servicer could affect the cash flows coming from a mortgage,
because the use of such agents was an innovation to which that investor had al-
ready become accustomed. Similarly, once that investor became accustomed to
investing in private-label MBSs, that investor may have questioned the addi-
tional risks posed by the inclusion of risky mortgages in a subprime MBS, but
might not revisit the question of whether purchase agreements could be relied
upon to ensure mortgage originators had engaged in appropriate due diligence
686 [Vol. 64:657
FRAGMENTATION NODES
in determining whether to extend a loan packaged into an MBS. Nor would
such an investor be likely to scrutinize a gradual increase in the number or di-
versity of tranches issued in MBS transactions. Similarly, regulators who wit-
ness this evolution may not step back and question whether the evolution and
proliferation of a financial innovation might have systemic effects that vary,
qualitatively, from the issues associated with any particular incremental innova-
tion or any individual transaction. In general, there may be a tendency for all
involved to examine closely only the issues raised by the most recent incremen-
tal change.
The incremental nature of the processes through which financial innova-
tions become highly complex is critical to understanding how that complexity
develops and why that complexity itself may not be subjected to close scrutiny
by market participants or regulators. Despite its importance, this issue has been
largely overlooked in other accounts of the 2007-2009 financial crisis or finan-
cial crises more generally.90
A final note about the processes through which these innovative transac-
tions spread is the role played by other financial innovations. Li's Gaussian co-
pula and innovations in modeling provided market participants and regulators
with a plausible basis for believing that the complexity, while great, was mana-
geable. 1 While the extent of reliance on such tools has been the subject of
heated debates in the wake of the crisis, it is clear that many of these develop-
ments were genuinely valuable innovations, and it is equally clear that at least
some market participants and regulators believed, to a fault, in the capacity of
such innovations to render the risks inherent in even the most complicated new
financial instrument knowable. In other words, it was not just the incremental
nature of these processes that helped enable the complexity that resulted, but
also the availability of a story that market participants could tell themselves
about why the resultant complexity need not be a source of concern.
3. Other factors shaping these markets
The story presented thus far has taken as given the heterogeneity of inves-
tors, the legitimacy of investor demand for assets with particular characteristics
(like a AAA rating), the appropriateness of the steps taken by financial inter-
mediaries and others involved in these transactions to feed investor demand,
and that those intermediaries were feeding, rather than creating, the investor
demand. In so doing, this account has largely assumed that these transactions at
least appeared to create value on a localized basis when they were consum-
mated. This Subpart briefly addresses some of the factors which may have con-
90. A related and well-recognized phenomenon is that in assessing the risks of a finan-
cial instrument, investors may be overly influenced by recent events. See HYMAN P. MINsKY,
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNEs 110 (2008).
91. See Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 823.
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tributed to these transactions spreading even further than could be explained by
the gap between their localized and systemic effects. Consistent with the prag-
matic aim of this Article to consider what regulators and others reasonably
could have known and what actions they may have taken prior to the crisis, the
hindsight-enabled insight that many of these transactions did not create real
value even on a localized basis92 is largely delegated to the sidelines for the
remainder of this Article. Nonetheless, some of these other forces merit men-
tion in light of the important contributory role they may have played in leading
up to the crisis, the fact that many of them may have been visible to regulators,
and the possibility that regulators should be mindful of them in assessing the
benefits and risks associated with the spread of other financial innovations.
a. Regulation
Among the key drivers of financial innovation generally are efforts to re-
duce the cost of regulatory compliance.93 Often referred to as "regulatory arbi-
trage," such efforts can take a wide array of forms. If a regulation makes it
more expensive for financial institutions to hold X-type assets than Y-type as-
sets, for example, financial institutions will find ways to make Xs look like Ys
for purposes of the regulation. Similarly, innovative financial transactions may
be used to make it appear that an asset has been transferred from a regulated
entity, for which it is costly to hold such an asset, to a nonregulated entity, even
when the regulated entity retains an economic interest in the transferred asset.94
That regulatory arbitrage contributed to the growth of the MBS and CDO
markets is well established.95 Much of the demand for AAA-rated assets came
from investors who faced regulatory or other constraints that required or made
it less costly for them to hold such assets.96 While such transactions may create
92. See Charles W. Calomiris, Financial Innovation, Regulation, and Reform, 29
CATO J. 65, 67 (2009) ("[O]n an ex ante basis, risk was substantially underestimated in the
market during the subprime boom of 2003-07.").
93. See id. at 65 ("Financial innovations often respond to regulation by sidestepping
regulatory restrictions that would otherwise limit activities in which people wish to en-
gage."); see also PARTNOY, supra note 7, at 46 ("[A] major impulse for financial innovation
[i]s a desire to avoid regulation." (citing Merton H. Miller, Financial Innovation: The Last
Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 459 (1986))).
94. See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 67-73 (describing these "boundary
problems"). See generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REv. 227, 229
(2010) ("Regulatory arbitrage exploits the gap between the economic substance of a transac-
tion and its legal or regulatory treatment, taking advantage of the legal system's intrinsically
limited ability to attach formal labels that track the economics of transactions with sufficient
precision.").
95. See RAJAN, supra note 19, at 16; Calomiris, supra note 92, at 65.
96. See Acharya et al., supra note 8, at 295 (arguing that one of the primary drivers of
securitization transactions in the years leading up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis was an
attempt by regulated financial entities to reduce the amount of capital they were required to
hold under applicable regulations while not making commensurate adjustments in the true
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value to the parties involved by allowing them to reduce the regulatory burden
to which they would otherwise be subject, such value is often not welfare en-
hancing. Moreover, regulated entities seeking to circumvent regulations to
which they are subject may be willing to pay a premium for the ability to do so,
skewing price signals and other market indicators.
b. Agency costs
Another key factor contributing to the spread of MBSs and CDOs was
agency costs. One source of agency costs arose from tensions between the indi-
viduals making investment decisions or overseeing those decisions and the per-
sons whose money they were putting at risk.97 Notably, the complexity of
mortgage securities may have increased these agency costs by limiting the abil-
ity of shareholders and others to effectively monitor and identify self-serving
behavior.
Another reason that these transactions may have flourished even if they did
not create value is that the very complexity of the transactions may have in-
creased the tendency of investors to rely upon the expertise of the financial in-
termediaries who sponsored the transactions, the agencies that rated them, and
the other parties involved in setting up these transactions.98 Because these par-
ties earned significant fees for the services they provided, they often had a
strong incentive to consummate as many transactions as possible, even if
somewhat constrained by reputational and other considerations. 99
While a thorough examination of these dynamics is beyond the scope of
this Article, they are noted to make clear that the assumption (employed for the
sake of simplicity and to reduce the effect of hindsight bias) that these transac-
risks to which they were exposed); Richard Cantor et al., The Use of Credit Ratings in In-
vestment Management in the US and Europe, J. FIXED INCOME, Fall 2007, at 13, 14, 17 exhi-
bit lB (noting that in the United States, "there are currently over 100 federal laws and 50
regulations incorporating credit ratings," and finding that seventy-four percent of the fund
managers in their study were subject to ratings-based restrictions on the financial instruments
they could hold).
97. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247, 249 (2010); Okamoto, supra note 59, at 188; Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Finan-
cial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG.
457, 457-58 (2009).
98. See Lord Adair Turner, Chairman, U.K. Fin. Servs. Auth., The Economist's Inau-
gural City Lecture (Jan. 21, 2009) ("[T]here must be a suspicion that some and perhaps
much of the structuring and trading activity involved in the complex version of securitised
credit, was not required to deliver credit intermediation efficiently, but achieved an econom-
ic rent extraction made possible by the opacity of margins and the asymmetry of information
and knowledge between end users of financial services and producers.") (transcript available
at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/0121_at.shtml).
99. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Went Wrong? A Tragedy in Three Acts, 6 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 403, 408-10 (2009).
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tions appeared to create value at the time they were consummated likely over-
states significantly the value of these transactions.
III. FRAGMENTATION NODES AND SYSTEMIC RISK
This Part examines two phenomena arising from the proliferation of frag-
mentation nodes which give rise to systemic risk-information loss and stick-
iness. It explains why each phenomenon may be expected to arise as fragmen-
tation nodes proliferate, and how each phenomenon may become a source of
systemic risk. This Part also provides evidence from the 2007-2009 financial
crisis showing that MBS and CDO transactions did contribute to systemic risk
through information loss and stickiness, with troubling consequences.
A. Information Loss
1. Fragmentation nodes and information loss
In any securities offering, the issuer selling the securities has more infor-
mation about the value of the securities offered than the potential investors
do.100 The acts of conveying information (by the seller) and processing infor-
mation (by the investor) are resource intensive. While a seller must be able to
convey sufficient information to a potential investor to convince the investor
that the expected returns justify the price being asked, the cost to both parties of
this information exchange ensures that the buyer will never know quite as much
as the seller. As a result, some information is lost in every transaction. 101 The
issue here is not just that information is lost, but that the nature and magnitude
of the information loss arising from MBSs and CDOs is sufficiently distinctive
to merit particular attention. There are a number of reasons for this.
We can understand the informational challenge by considering the four
sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes: (1) fragmentation, (2)
the creation of contingent and dynamic economic interests, (3) a latent competi-
tive tendency among the tranches, and (4) the lengthening of the chain separat-
ing investor and investment. 102 Because of fragmentation, the number of per-
100. Bernard S. Black, Information Asymmetry, the Internet, and Securities Offerings, 2
J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 91, 92 (1998) ("[T]he single largest cost that stands between
issuers and investors is the problem of asymmetric information.").
101. See id. at 92-93.
102. The account here provides a more thorough analysis of the relationship between
the sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes and the resultant information loss,
which is critical if we are going to understand how these dynamics might arise again. How-
ever, this Article is far from the first to point out that the complexity of these transaction
structures contributed to a loss of information. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 99, at 409; Scott
& Taylor, supra note 88; The Gods Strike Back: A Special Report on Financial Risk,
EcONOMIST, Feb. 13, 2010, at 2; Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Legal and Economic Issues in Liti-
gation Arising from the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis, 26 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. &
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sons with an economic interest in a home loan increases dramatically when that
loan is placed into a fragmentation node. As a result, each investor has only a
very small stake in the performance of any particular loan underlying its in-
vestment, and an investor would face a massive informational burden if it ac-
tually sought to understand all of the loans underlying its investment. Moreo-
ver, as reflected in the dynamic and contingent nature of the economic interests
created, each investor's economic stake in any particular loan is not fixed. Ra-
ther, an MBS investor's interest in a loan varies depending upon its perfor-
mance and the performance of the other loans with which it is pooled, so an in-
vestor must be concerned with correlation among the performance of the assets.
The second and third sources of complexity further increase the informa-
tional burden an MBS investor faces, in that the value of a particular MBS also
depends upon the mechanisms built into the waterfall to allocate cash flow
rights among the various tranches.103 The informational burden created by the
relevance of these credit-enhancement mechanisms, as well as the pertinence of
the degree of correlation in the default risk of the assets in the portfolio, merit
particular attention because these are informational burdens that did not exist
prior to the creation of the fragmentation node. As a result, the information loss
arising from these transactions is not just the byproduct of inevitable informa-
tion asymmetries, but is also a product of the introduction of new informa-
tion-information which no party may be adequately incentivized to fully un-
derstand. The fourth and final source of complexity-the length of the chain-
increases the informational burden on an investor by limiting the investor's
ability to observe directly the quality of the assets underlying its investment.
This stands in stark contrast to the direct relationship between a bank and a
homeowner which would exist in the absence of securitization and which might
enable the bank to monitor both the home and borrower more closely.
The informational burden placed on an investor is magnified with the addi-
tion of a second or third fragmentation node, such as a CDO or a CDO2 104
When the assets underlying a fragmentation node are themselves structured
finance products, each asset requires just as much effort to understand fully as
the single MBS just described. The magnitude of the informational burden this
places on a potential CDO investor arises both from the compounding of the
number of assets which ultimately underlie the investment-recall the number
of home loans and other assets underlying the CDOs2 described by Scott and
Tayloro105 and from the fact that the cash flows coming from each of those as-
Bus., Discussion Paper No. 612, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract-1096582.
103. Ingo Fender & Janet Mitchell, The Future of Securitisation: How to Align Incen-
tives?, BIS Q. REv., Sept. 2009, at 27, 30.
104. See The Gods Strike Back, supra note 102, at 2 ("A proper understanding of a typ-
ical collateralised debt obligation . would have required reading 30,000 pages of docu-
mentation.").
105. See supra text accompanying note 88.
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sets go through two (or more) different fragmentation nodes before reaching
the investor. As a result, the relationships among the expected performance of
the assets gathered at each node and the terms of the waterfall for each node are
layered on top of information about the quality of the thousands (or tens or
hundreds of thousands) of home loans ultimately underlying the CDO security
issued as information relevant to the value of that security.
On the other side of these massive potential informational burdens lies a
very modest return to investors, particularly for the AAA-rated tranches, which
constituted the great majority (in terms of principal value) of the MBS and
CDO securities issued.106 At the same time, because MBSs and CDOs are
fixed-income securities with finite life spans, the upside potential on these se-
curities is necessarily capped. This distinguishes these securities from other as-
sets like stock, commodities, and real estate, for which the potential gains are
not so limited. The limited upside offered by these securities is critical because
a potential investor will not expend greater resources collecting and processing
information about a security than the excess returns that investor expects to re-
ceive from that investment. 107
To be clear, the claim here does not relate to whether it was possible for
investors to obtain sufficient information upon which to make an investment
decision in light of these constraints. One may argue that it was irrational for an
investor to acquire these securities without a better understanding of the asso-
ciated risks. Nor does the claim rely on any assumptions regarding the degree
to which investors may have relied upon credit ratings or the reasonableness of
such reliance. These are not the type of assessment that regulators or other out-
side observers are in a good position to make. The claim, rather, is that because
of the limited amount of resources investors rationally could have expended
learning about the MBSs and CDOs prior to making an acquisition decision,
and because of the amount of information potentially relevant to the value of
those securities, an outside observer could have surmised that most investors
were acquiring these securities without a complete understanding of all of the
information pertinent to their value. The net result was that, as fragmentation
nodes backed by home loans rapidly spread prior to the 2007-2009 financial
crisis, there was an equally rapid and systematic loss of information about the
quality of the underlying home loans and the value of the various securities
backed by them. We now turn to address the consequences of that information
106. See Yongheng Deng et al., CDO Market Implosion and the Pricing of Subprime
Mortgage-Backed Securities, 20 J. HOuSING EcoN. 68, 70-71 figs. 1 & 2 (2011) (showing the
average spread between U.S. Treasury bonds and subprime MBSs and the average spread
between U.S. Treasury bonds and CDOs backed by subprime MBSs to each be within the
range of two to four percent between 2004 and 2006).
107. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 221 (applying the "rational ignorance theory" to the
evaluation of complex securities to explain why "[c]omplexity can deprive investors and
other market participants of the understanding needed for markets to operate effectively,"
even if all of the information regarding an investment is made available to investors).
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loss, namely, that it contributed to inaccurate price signals and greater systemic
fragility. Each is addressed in turn.
2. Inaccurate price signals and bubbles
Financial crises are often preceded by a bubble in which one or more
classes of assets are traded at prices far in excess of their fundamental
values.los While information loss is not a necessary condition for a bubble to
form, it may facilitate the growth of a bubble. As Ronald Gilson and Reinier
Kraakman explain in their classic article on the mechanisms of market efficien-
cy, the accuracy of price signals depends in part on the presence of informed
traders in the relevant marketplace.10 9 The lack of sufficiently capitalized in-
formed traders (relative to poorly informed traders) can increase the amount of
noise surrounding the price signals created in that market.o10 While the amount
of noise need not skew the price signals so long as the direction of the noise is
arbitrary, the lack of informed price signals may create an environment in
which it is easier for a bubble to develop.
To understand the role of information loss in the events preceding the
2007-2009 financial crisis, it is necessary to recognize that the real estate bub-
ble was in fact two related but distinct bubbles-one in real estate and a second
in mortgage securities. The real estate bubble was enabled, at least in part, by
the influx of capital into mortgage securities, which increased the amount of
capital available for home loans, particularly subprime home loans. 11 Without
that influx of capital, and, more specifically, the expectation among mortgage
originators that they could quickly and easily resell loans into the secondary
market, lending standards most likely would not have declined as far as they
did, and real estate prices would not have escalated as high as they did. That
capital, however, came in significant part from investors who did not have a
clear view through to the quality of the loans underlying their investments.
As we saw in Part II, strong investor demand for AAA-rated assets offering
slightly higher yields than other comparably rated investments translated into
demand for highly rated subprime MBSs and CDOs. That demand in turn
108. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 10 ("[The] most dangerous type of reces-
sion/depression is caused by the bursting of an investment bubble."); Franklin Allen et al.,
Financial Crises: Theory and Evidence, I ANN. REV. FiN. ECON. 97, 98 (2009) (noting that
research on financial crises has shown "that systemic banking crises are typically preceded
by credit booms and asset price bubbles").
109. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549 (1984).
110. See id at 565-92. A distinct but related consideration contributing to these bubbles
were limitations on the ability of investors to take short positions on housing prices. See Pa-
tricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation
and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1327, 1373 (2009).
Ill. See RAJAN, supra note 19, at 16; John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesign-
ing the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REv. 707, 731-32 (2009).
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created a demand for subprime loans that could be packaged into subprime
MBSs, and in turn subprime MBSs that could be packaged into CDOs. Infor-
mation loss was likely critical to the growth of these interdependent markets.
The lower-rated tranches of MBSs are often the most informationally sensitive,
so the buyers of these tranches generally have the greatest incentive to scrutin-
ize closely the quality of the underlying home loans.1 12 The ability to sell these
tranches to CDOs combined with the fact that it was irrational for most CDO
investors to examine closely the home loans ultimately underlying those in-
vestments (because of the resource-return tradeoff just discussed) suggests that
the growth of the CDO and CDO2 markets and the information losses accom-
panying that growth may well have contributed to the degradation in underwrit-
ing standards and practices and the growth of the subprime market. Those de-
velopments, in turn, facilitated real estate speculation, accentuating the tenden-
tendency of the influx of capital from mortgage securities to drive up real estate
prices.113
This account, while somewhat speculative, is supported by the data availa-
ble. For example, the federal panel created to investigate the causes of the
2007-2009 financial crisis, the Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), un-
dertook an "examination of the relative performance of mortgages purchased or
guaranteed by the GSEs" and "those securitized in the private market." 1 4 Be-
cause loans owned or guaranteed by a GSE were not originated by that GSE,
they should be similar to loans packaged into private-label MBSs to the extent
that issues arise merely from the separation of loan origination and ownership.
The FCIC's findings provide valuable insights into the effects of adding a
fragmentation node to the equation, strongly suggesting that the presence of a
fragmentation node has a significant and deleterious effect.
The FCIC's examination reveals that "[t]he worst-performing 5% of [the]
loans [held or guaranteed by the GSEs] are in subgroups with rates of serious
delinquency similar to the best-performing 5% of [private-label MBS] loans"
(i.e., those packaged into a fragmentation node).' 15 The subgroups employed
by the FCIC enable them to control for other variables, such as the credit score
of the borrower and the amount of the loan relative to the value of the home it
financed. They further found that, for borrowers with credit scores below 660,
112. See MacKenzie, supra note 68, at 1799-80 ("[T]hose who bought the lowest[-
rated] externally sold tranches . . . frequently performed their own evaluations of default
risk."); John Kiff & Michael Kisser, Asset Securitization and Optimal Retention 27 (Int'l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/74, 2010) (showing that under certain circumstances,
"the screening level under mezzanine retention is actually lower than if the securitizer had
retained the equity tranche").
113. E.g., Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Essay, Systemic Risk and Market In-
stitutions, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 445, 445 (2009) (arguing that it was "the pro-cyclical expan-
sion of underpriced credit [through private-label MBSs] . . . that drove asset prices up").
114. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 69, at 216.
115. Id. at 218.
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"by the end of 2008, GSE mortgages were far less likely to be seriously delin-
quent than were non-GSE securitized mortgages: 6.2% versus 28.3%."l 16
These data and other anecdotal evidence strongly suggest that-while far
from the only cause-the loss of information arising from the length and the
complexity of the chain separating MBS and CDO investors from the home
loans underlying their investments facilitated the growth of both the real estate
bubble and the related bubble in mortgage securities.117 Had a typical CDO in-
vestor been able to see plainly the quality of the home loans underlying his in-
vestment, he likely would not have been so willing to invest for such a modest
return, and less capital would have been available to make low-quality home
loans.
To be sure, there are two related issues at stake here. One is the mispricing
of the risk associated with home loans, particularly subprime home loans,
which was a primary factor in both the real estate and mortgage security bub-
bles. The other, related issue is the extension of loans that were particularly un-
likely to be repaid even on the excessively generous terms on which they were
being offered. The claim here is that both may be traced, at least in part, to the
information loss that resulted from the proliferation of MBSs and CDOs. The
FCIC's finding that loans packaged into fragmentation nodes performed sub-
stantially worse than seemingly similar GSE loans suggests that the presence of
a fragmentation node increased the probability of low-quality loans being
made. 118 Moreover, as reflected in the timing of the decline in underwriting
standards and practices and the growth of the CDO market, there is reason to
suspect that as the number of fragmentation nodes along the typical chain in-
creased, so too did the proportion of low-quality underlying assets. 119 The em-
pirical evidence is thus consistent with the conjecture that as the number of
fragmentation nodes increased, so too did the rate at which home loans were
extended that should not have been. Moreover, because the lowest quality loans
should have fetched the lowest prices, this evidence also suggests that the dis-
parity between fundamental values and the prices paid may well have increased
with the number of fragmentation nodes separating the ultimate investor from
the underlying home loan. The two issues are correlated, and are at least par-
tially attributable to information loss, because of the reduced incentive and ca-
116. Id. at xxvi.
117. Cf Christopher Cox, Former Chairman, SEC, Testimony Before the Fin. Crisis In-
quiry Comm'n (May 5, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/
2008/ ts102308cc.htm) (quoting with approval Former SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner's
statement that "if honest lending practices had been followed, much of this crisis quite simp-
ly would not have occurred"). Further support for this conjecture arises from the fact that it
may be rational for investors to vary the amount of information they collect based on their
perception of the state of the economy, and investors also will tend to invest little effort in
detecting fraud during booms. See Paul Povel et al., Booms, Busts, and Fraud, 20 REV. FIN.
STuDIEs 1219, 1220-21 (2007).
118. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 69, at 216-18.
119. See supra Part II.B.2.
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pacity of the ultimate investors to conduct due diligence regarding the quality
of the underlying assets or to understand the ways that changes in the prices of
the underlying assets (or correlations among them) might impact the value of
MBSs and CDOs backed by them. In short, while information loss may not be
necessary for a bubble to arise, hindsight suggests that it may well have played
a role in the bubbles that preceded the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and that the
dynamics that occurred may well arise again.
3. Fragility
In addition to facilitating inaccurate price signals and the growth of bub-
bles, information loss contributes to systemic risk in other, more direct ways.
To understand how, it is necessary to revisit the question of what makes a risk
systemic. As Amir Khandani, Andrew Lo, and Robert Merton explain,
"[S]ystemic risk . . . arises when large financial losses affect important eco-
nomic entities that are unprepared for and unable to withstand such losses,
causing a cascade of failures and widespread loss of confidence." 1 20 Lack of
information increases the likelihood of such a scenario in at least three ways.
First, when information is lost, risks may be passed on without the reci-
pient fully appreciating the nature or magnitude of the risk to which he is now
exposed. In addition to increasing the likelihood that the price the recipient
pays for an asset is not commensurate with its risk, as just described, this unin-
formed risk assumption increases the likelihood that the recipient will not be
positioned to withstand the associated losses should the risk become manifest.
Second, information loss makes market participants more reactive to new
information. One well-recognized mechanism through which local financial
distress can spread to the banking system generally is "similarity" or "common-
mode failure." This arises when the failure of one financial institution sends
signals to the marketplace about the financial well-being of other institutions
with similar exposures. 121 If market participants were perfectly informed, of
course, a failure would not convey any new information. Lack of information is
thus a precondition to the capacity of such an event to convey information, and
the greater the amount of information that has been lost, the more informative
the signal may be (or may be perceived to be).122 As a result, as information
120. Khandani, Lo & Merton, supra note 26, at 46.
121. See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 3; Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher
Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers and the Case for a Systemic
Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 160 (2011).
122. This account uses the term information very broadly. A more detailed account of
the mechanisms through which this updating occurs would require more granular analysis of
the interplay between the hard facts known to an investor and the forecasting he necessarily
engages in to reach an informed view on the appropriate price of a security. See Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 109, at 562 ("[T]he acquisition of a new piece of 'hard' information
of major importance is likely to affect the trader's master forecast of price not only directly
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loss increases, the financial system becomes more vulnerable to this type of
contagion, increasing systemic risk. The contagion can be set off by any ostens-
ibly reliable signal that conveys new information to the market about the value
of or risks posed by a particular class of assets or business strategy. 123
Third, widespread information loss sets the stage for paralyzing uncertain-
ty. When a signal conveys new information suggesting that an investor has
dramatically underappreciated the nature or magnitude of a risk to which he is
exposed, that revelation introduces the possibility that the investor may also be
exposed to other underappreciated risks. Thus, in addition to making adjust-
ments directly responsive to the new information conveyed by the signal, the
investor is likely to exercise significantly greater caution in assessing and tak-
ing actions in response to other possible risks as well. 124 The result can be
widespread panic. Put differently, massive information loss increases the like-
lihood that bad information will be of the "scary bad" kind, to use a term of-
fered by John Geanakoplos, and thus "instead of clarifying matters" will "in-
crease[] uncertainty and disagreement about the future." 12 5
4. The unfolding of the 2007-2009 financial crisis
This Subpart considers evidence from the 2007-2009 financial crisis sug-
gesting that the spread of fragmentation nodes backed by home loans did result
in a massive loss of information, and that loss became a source of systemic risk.
The descriptive portion of the account that follows draws heavily upon the
work of Gary Gorton, who because of his roles as a former consultant to AIG
and as an academic economist was particularly well positioned to understand
the evolution of the crisis. 126 This account uses an overview of the early phases
but also indirectly, by altering the information on which much of his 'soft,' or forecast in-
formation is based.").
123. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND
CRASHES 90 (5th ed., 2005) (describing the way "[n]ew information may precipitate a
crash").
124. See Joseph R. Mason, Regulating for Financial System Development, Financial
Institutions Stability, and Financial Innovation, in FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION IN THE
WAKE OF FINANCIAL CRISES: THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE 226,232 (Alfredo Gigliobianco &
Gianni Toniolo eds., 2009) ("In an asymmetric information financial crisis, investors-
knowing there has been a shock to asset values but not knowing the distribution of that shock
among investments-rationally pull back from the market as a whole to decrease their prob-
able exposure.").
125. Geanakoplos, supra note 33, at 104. Notably, Geanakoplos does not address the
possibility, claimed here, that characteristics of the environment into which the news is
transmitted affects whether it is of the "scary bad" variety.
126. See, e.g., GORTON, supra note 31; Gorton, supra note 54. Interestingly, while Gor-
ton provides one of the best examinations of the ways information loss contributed to the
2007-2009 financial crisis, he seems to view the information loss arising from the spread of
MBSs and CDOs as largely idiosyncratic to that crisis. See GORTON, supra note 31, at 146
(stating that in his view the problem does not lie with "securitization generally" but rather
lies with "the particular form of the design of subprime mortgages"). By developing a theory
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of that crisis to establish the plausibility of the claim, drawing attention to indi-
cations that information was lost and that the resultant losses contributed to sys-
temic instability through each of the three mechanisms just identified. For the
sake of brevity, many important subsequent developments, including many
supportive of this claim, are not addressed.
As described in Part II, the performance of subprime home loans, MBSs
backed by subprime loans and CDOs containing, among other things, tranches
of subprime MBSs were correlated to each other, and to the housing market.
According to Gorton, this "was widely understood," but "there was a lack of
common knowledge about the effects and timing of house price changes."1 27
As a result, early indications that housing values may have been weakening or
in decline were not immediately reflected in the prices of subprime MBSs,
CDOs, and other financial instruments with linked values, even though the ex-
pected future cash flows from these financial instruments could be significantly
affected by the performance of the housing market.
The key turning point, according to Gorton, was the introduction of the
ABX.HE index. The ABX.HE index, launched in January 2006, tracks the val-
ue of credit default swaps referencing a pool of twenty subprime MBSs issued
in the preceding six months for each of five credit ratings: AAA, AA, A, BBB,
and BBB-. New indices were formed every six months thereafter, until mid-
2007. The swaps referencing the index were over-the-counter transactions in
which one party agreed to make payments to the other upon the occurrence of
enumerated "credit events" in the underlying subprime MBSs.128 The prices of
these swaps were updated on a daily basis. The indices thus provided a standar-
dized and widely available source of current information about the pricing of
subprime risk. 129 As other economists have noted, prior to the introduction of
the ABX.HE index "there was no real mechanism for aggregating information
about the value of subprime mortgages and the securities that they collatera-
lized."l30
In early 2007, the ABX.HE index referencing MBSs rated BBB for the first
quarter of 2007 began to fall shortly after issuance, and the same index for the
second quarter of 2007 started trading substantially below par. Because of the
unique visibility of these indices, their rapid decline sent a strong signal to all
about why information loss may be expected to increase systemic risk as a general matter,
this Article goes beyond his analysis of that issue.
127. Gorton, supra note 54, at 21-22.
128. Potential credit events "includ[e] interest shortfall, principal shortfall, or a write-
down of the underlying subprime MBS." Dunbar et al., supra note 45, at 135.
129. See, e.g., Markit ABXHE-Product Summary, MARKIT, http://www.markit.com/
en/products/datalindices/structured-finance-indices/abx/abx.page? (last visited Mar. 9, 2012)
(explaining that the indices provide "a liquid, tradeable tool" that enables "investors to accu-
rately gaugue [sic] market sentiment around the asset-class, and to take short or long posi-
tions accordingly").
130. Dunbar et al., supra note 45, at 134; see also Gorton, supra note 54, at 20.
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market participants that financial instruments exposed to subprime risk were
worth substantially less than the prices at which they had been trading. The ef-
fects of this signal were threefold and followed the mechanisms set forth above:
the holders of subprime MBSs, CDOs, and other financial instruments with
subprime MBS exposure faced losses for which they had not adequately pre-
pared; some of those entities faced financial distress, sending further signals to
the marketplace; and concern about the possibility of underappreciated risks in
other assets led to a wave of uncertainty, sending at least some market partici-
pants into a panic-like state and severely disrupting the functioning of a number
of markets.
When the ABX.HE index started its decline, structured investment vehicles
(SIVs), asset-backed commercial paper conduits, and other similar entities
funded in whole or in part by short-term asset-backed commercial paper were
among the parties holding MBSs and CDOs. 131 These managed entities made
money by funding such longer-term assets with shorter-term liabilities (like
commercial paper) and were central features of the shadow banking system.13 2
The precipitous fall in the ABX.HE indices was followed by a "run" on these
SIVs, as investors in the short-term asset-backed commercial paper funding the
SIVs refused to roll over those investments as they matured.13 3
The actual risk exposures of these SIVs, established with the benefit of
hindsight, cannot justify investor response. 134 That is, the cause of this run was
not the actual credit risk to which these entities were exposed, but rather uncer-
tainty about the magnitude of that risk, prompted by the informational signal
sent by the rapid decline in the ABX.HE index and by the fact that investors
had only a limited understanding of the actual risks to which the SIVs (and
hence the commercial paper that they issued) were exposed.135 As Federal Re-
serve Chairman Ben Bernanke explained in a speech a few months later:
[T]he developments in subprime were perhaps more a trigger than a funda-
mental cause of the financial turmoil. The episode led investors to become
more uncertain about valuations of a range of complex or opaque structured
credit products, not just those backed by subprime mortgages. They also
131. See, e.g., Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No.
28,807, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 32,691 (proposed July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
270, 274) (providing a summary of these developments); Acharya et al., supra note 8, at
281; Gorton, supra note 54, at 24.
132. See, e.g., Gerding, supra note 4, at 14-15.
133. Acharya et al., supra note 8, at 283 (explaining that during this collapse of the
market for asset-backed commercial paper, the cost of issuing such paper "rose from just 15
basis points over the Federal Funds rate to over 100 basis points," effectively requiring the
SIV sponsors to bail them out).
134. See Gorton, supra note 54, at 24.
135. This reaction may have been particularly swift because many of the investors in
those entities were money market funds, which may be particularly quick to divest them-
selves of assets with uncertain risk exposures. See, e.g., Money Market Fund Reform, 74
Fed. Reg. at 32,691.
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reacted to market developments by increasing their assessment of the risks as-
sociated with a number of assets and, to some degree, by reducing their wil-
lingness to take on risk more generally 136
To be sure, Bernanke underestimated the magnitude of the problems to come
when he made these statements, but that does not undermine his assessment of
the processes through which investors responded to these developments.
Following the run on SIVs, the market for repurchase agreements (or "re-
pos"), which are essentially fully secured short-term loans, contracted dramati-
cally.137 The repo market is built upon the assumption that repos, because they
are short term, fully collateralized, and entitled to certain preferences in the
event of bankruptcy, are very low-risk investments. The assets that had been
used as collateral for repos included not only the subprime MBSs and CDOs
described thus far, but a variety of other complex structured financial products
as well. Just as had happened in the run on SIVs, the uncertainty surrounding
the value of subprime MBSs and CDOs made it difficult for those seeking fi-
nancing through repo agreements to use any of these assets as collateral on
terms commensurate with those they had been able to obtain prior to the SIV
run.138 Put differently, the rapidly declining prices of subprime MBSs and
CDOs forced investors to recognize how little they knew about the fundamental
value of other similarly complex financial instruments. This development led
them to question whether other assets about which they had a similar amount
(or lack) of information might also be worth far less than they had thought. As
a result, individual participants in the marketplace became more risk averse in
unison, which had adverse systemic consequences. 139 Because many financial
institutions, particularly investment banks, had come to rely upon repo financ-
ing to fund their trading and other operations, the evaporation of the repo mar-
ket adversely affected the ability of financial institutions to continue to serve as
market makers for other financial products, causing the markets for virtually all
types of financial instruments to contract. 140
136. Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address on the Recent Financial Tur-
moil and its Economic and Policy Consequences (Oct. 15, 2007).
137. The Gods Strike Back, supra note 102, at 8 ("As confidence ebbed, mortgage-
backed securities could no longer be used so easily as collateral in . . . 'repo' agreements.");
Gorton, supra note 54, at 26 (describing how there was a run on repo).
138. See Acharya et al., supra note 8, at 303 (discussing the "abrupt shifts in the mar-
ket price of risk when the crisis took hold in August 2007" and suggesting they came about
because up until that time investors did not have a good understanding of the risks to which
financial institutions and entities they sponsored were exposed). One of the primary effects
of this uncertainty was that repo traders demanded a greater haircut with respect to these
types of assets, which had the effect of limiting the amount of short-term financing an entity
could obtain using such assets as collateral.
139. See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 23 ("When liquidity dries up, it disap-
pears altogether rather than being re-allocated elsewhere . . . . Thus, there is a generalized
decline in the willingness to lend.").
140. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-
2008, J. EcoN. PERSP., Winter 2009, at 77, 80; The Gods Strike Back, supra note 102, at 8.
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Among the financial institutions most seriously affected by these dramatic
changes in the repo market was investment bank Bear Steams, which also was
suffering from insufficiently anticipated losses as a result of its sizeable portfo-
lio of subprime and other MBSs and CDOs. 141 The combination resulted in a
fire sale of Bear Steams to JP Morgan Chase, which, even at the fire-sale price
of the transaction, was viable only because of significant financial support from
the federal government.142 This event in turn sent a signal to the market that
other firms with large MBS and CDO portfolios might also be facing severe
financial distress. 143 While it was not until months later that Lehman Brothers
filed for bankruptcy and the financial crisis reached its peak, the groundwork
for those failures was laid, and the mechanisms leading to those failures fol-
lowed many of the same patterns just described. 144 The subprime crisis thus
became a full-blown financial crisis, and the loss of information arising from
the complexity of the MBS and CDO transactions that had spread subprime risk
played a crucial role in this development.
As this account reflects, numerous factors operating together contributed to
the financial crisis. Without investment banks' excessive reliance on repos and
other modes of short-term financing, for example, the reverberations of the sys-
tematic loss of information about the value of the assets underlying MBSs and
CDOs would likely not have been as severe. At the same time, without infor-
mation loss, investment banks' reliance on short-term financing might not have
been so problematic, and the magnitude of the 2007-2009 financial crisis might
have been much smaller. As will be discussed further in Part IV, we can begin
to see why information loss arising from complexity may be among the sources
of systemic risk that regulators should target. But any such efforts should sup-
plement, rather than supplant, other efforts to reduce systemic risk.
B. Stickiness
This Subpart examines a second source of systemic risk arising from the
complexity associated with the spread of MBSs and CDOs-stickiness. Stick-
iness here refers to the creation, within a dynamic financial market, of ar-
rangements which are exceptionally difficult to modify. This Subpart considers
how packaging home loans into fragmentation nodes increased their stickiness
and how such stickiness can become a source of systemic risk. In so doing, it
141. Jan Boardman, Note, The Collapse and Rescue of Bear Stearns, 28 REv. BANKING
& FIN. L. 42, 43-45 (2008).
142. See id. at 45-46.
143. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 121, at 160.
144. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 108, at 99 (stating that the "more disruptive con-
sequence" of the Lehman bankruptcy "was the signal it sent" as "[r]eassessing risks pre-
viously overlooked, investors withdrew from the markets and liquidity dried up").
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builds upon and adds to a growing body of literature looking at these
dynamics.145
1. Fragmentation nodes and stickiness
One effect of the complex structure of fragmentation nodes is the capacity
of these transactions to function like an adhesive, holding in place the original
terms of the underlying assets. As described in Part II, the creation of multi-
tranche structures in which the rights of each tranche are set by reference to the
original terms of the underlying assets creates a latent competitive tendency
among the different tranches. Because any modification in the terms of an un-
derlying asset affects different tranches in a disparate manner, this competitive
tendency becomes manifest when circumstances arise that warrant such mod-
ification. In the context of an MBS, this means that any modification to the
terms of an underlying home loan will affect each tranche differently depend-
ing upon whether the interest rate, principal, or some other term is modified.
As the complexity of the MBS structure increases, so too does the range of
issues that can arise from modifications. This is reflected, for example, in the
various types of triggers that may be used to determine whether principal
should be distributed sequentially, and thus paid out only to the most senior
tranche still outstanding, or pro rata among all of the tranches. If such a trigger
is set by reference to the proportion of underlying loans that are delinquent at a
particular point in time, the process of renegotiating a significant number of
those underlying loans to avoid delinquency and default raises questions about
whether corresponding changes should be made to the terms of that trigger.
Given that the types of loan modifications at issue are expected to increase
the aggregate cash flows into the securitization vehicle, one may expect that the
holders of the different tranches could work together to ensure the modifica-
tions are made, agreeing to corresponding changes in the terms of each of the
tranches of the MBS as needed. There are, however, numerous coordination
challenges that must be overcome for this to happen, as the terms of the MBS
once issued may be changed only with the consent of all holders.146 Thus, in
addition to the latent competitive tendency among the tranches becoming ma-
nifest, each of the other sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes
further contributes to the stickiness of the original terms of the underlying
home loans.
145. E.g., Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Wor-
kout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 1075
(2009); Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36
DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 75 (2011); Hu & Black, supra note 7, at 687; Adam J. Levitin & Tara
Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 58 (2011); Christopher Mayer et al.,
Essay, A New Proposal for Loan Modfications, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 417, 418 (2009);
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 10, at 393.
146. See Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 145, at 1091-92.
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The sheer number of persons with an interest in an underlying loan-a
problem arising directly from the fragmentation of economic interests in that
loan-creates a host of coordination challenges.147 Contacting each of the in-
vestors, much less negotiating with and obtaining approvals from all of them, is
a highly resource-intensive endeavor. And if undertaken by anyone other than
the trustee (such as an MBS investor seeking to maximize the value of his in-
vestment in the face of changed circumstances), the task is made even more
challenging by the initial hurdle of trying to obtain the identities of all of the
investors holding MBSs issued in that transaction. Moreover, because of the
dynamic and contingent economic interests held by each tranche, the holder of
even the first-loss tranche may have a colorable claim that its interests were not
adequately protected depending upon the changes made. This creates a situa-
tion ripe for holdouts, as well as genuine claims by holders of one or more
tranches that a particular modification inappropriately favors other tranches.
The magnitude of these coordination issues increases with both the number of
different tranches and the complexity of the specific bundle of rights granted to
investors in each tranche.
Further adding to the coordination challenge is the final source of complex-
ity identified in Part II, the lengthening of the chain separating investor and in-
vestment, as one or more of tranches of the MBSs issued were often packaged
into serial fragmentation nodes like CDOs. This raises a preliminary issue of
trying to determine who, on behalf of the CDO, may approve changes in the
terms of MBSs. Moreover, virtually all of the coordination challenges that arise
at the MBS level also arise at the level of the CDO. As a result, the packaging
of tranches of an MBS into a serial fragmentation node is likely not just to in-
crease, but to compound in a dramatic, nonlinear fashion the stickiness prob-
lems just described.
The same web of coordination challenges will inhibit changes to any other
agreements to which the securitization vehicle is a party, such as the servicing
agreement setting forth the duties and obligations of the servicer retained to
handle administrative matters associated with holding a home loan. They also
complicate substantially the task of any agent, like the servicer, charged with
maximizing the value of the underlying assets. 148 The net result is a coordina-
tion nightmare, which, as we will see, has had real and adverse systemic
consequences.
147. Cf Michael Heller, The Tragedy ofthe Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 688 (1998) (describing the way
"[t]ransaction costs, holdouts, and rent-seeking may prevent" efficient solutions when too
many persons hold an exclusion right with respect to a piece of property).
148. Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: The Conflicted Trustee Dilemma, 54
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 707, 708-14 (2010).
March 2012] 703
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
2. Stickiness in the financial crisis
A core component of the 2007-2009 financial crisis was the first nation-
wide fall in residential housing prices since the Great Depression. These falling
home prices contributed to a dramatic rise in the rate of defaults on home
loans. 149 This Subpart shows how the stickiness just described inhibited and
otherwise adversely affected modifications to those home loans, and the next
Subpart shows how those effects became a source of systemic risk.
As noted in Part II, one key to making MBS structures work was the ap-
pointment of a servicer charged with collecting monthly payments from home-
owners, distributing those proceeds to the securitization vehicle, and dealing
with other issues that may arise in connection with "servicing" the underlying
home loans. 150 The obligations of a servicer to a private-label MBS securitiza-
tion are set forth in a pooling and servicing agreement. When delinquency and
default rates are low, the process of servicing a home loan is largely ministerial.
Foreclosures create some complications, but because the need for a servicer to
have the authority to oversee a foreclosure process was apparent at the outset,
servicing agreements contain detailed procedures for the servicer to follow. The
ability to address these situations ex ante through contract eliminated the need
to vest the servicer with much discretion, an arrangement that suited MBS in-
vestors and servicers alike. 151
While foreclosure procedures may have been clear, foreclosure is not the
only option available to the holder of a home loan when a homeowner defaults.
Modifying the terms of that loan is another, and one that may be particularly
appropriate if circumstances have changed substantially since the loan was ori-
ginated. While servicing agreements allow for modifications under certain cir-
cumstances, in the face of the skyrocketing default rates witnessed in the 2007-
2009 financial crisis, the nature and scope of the authority granted to servicers
to deal with nonperforming loans was revealed to be inadequately defined, and,
in many regards, just inadequate. One recent study of servicing agreements
found that the terms of servicing agreements in private-label MBSs, while vary-
ing significantly, were alike in providing servicers insufficient guidance on
how to handle loan modifications and insufficient monetary incentives to pur-
sue modification.152 Moreover, even when servicers had discretion to modify
149. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & OFFICE OF THRIFT
SUPERVISION, OCC AND OTS MORTGAGE METRICs REPORT: DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL BANK
AND FEDERAL THRIFT MORTGAGE LOAN DATA: FOURTH QUARTER 2009, at 14 (2010) (de-
scribing the increase in the proportion of mortgages that were seriously delinquent in 2009).
150. This discussion focuses solely on private-label MBSs.
151. See I FRANKEL, supra note 39, § 5.4, at 179.
152. See Larry Cordell et al., The Incentives ofMortgage Servicers: Myths and Realities
4, 17 (Divs. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ.
Discussion Ser. No. 2008-46, 2008); see also Mayer et al., supra note 145, at 423 ("Most
[servicing agreements] do not explicitly limit modifications, but instead contain vague lan-
guage that can paralyze servicers.").
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loans, they were not given sufficient incentives to do so in ways that would
maximize the value of the loan.153 These deficiencies may be attributed to how
infrequently home loans were modified prior to the financial crisis or to an ex-
pectation that limiting the ability of a servicer to modify a home loan will, in
general, increase the expected return on that home loan. 154
The effects of this stickiness, however, vary depending upon the circums-
tances in which it becomes manifest. When home values are stable or rising,
and the amount owed on a home loan is less than the value of the home secur-
ing it (as a result of a down payment, equity built up over the life of the loan, or
rising home values), foreclosure enables the holder of the loan to recover most,
if not the full amount, of the loan outstanding at the time of default. The recov-
ery rate falls significantly, however, when housing values are depressed. As a
result, when home prices started to fall at the beginning of the financial crisis,
foreclosure often ceased to be the best way to maximize the value of loans in
default, and modification became more important.155
Data regarding the rate of foreclosures and loan modifications during the
financial crisis reveal that servicers acting on behalf of MBSs have not been as
responsive to these developments as banks acting on their own behalf. One
study of seriously delinquent loans originated in or after 2005 revealed that the
securitization of a loan significantly increases the likelihood that the loan will
be foreclosed, rather than modified.156 A subsequent study "us[ing] direct and
precise data on renegotiation actions of lenders" found that "distressed securi-
tized loans are significantly less likely to be renegotiated (up to 36% in relative
terms) than similar bank-held loans."1 57 These results make clear that securiti-
153. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 145, at 29 ("It makes little sense [for servicers]
to maintain a large coterie of experienced loss mitigation personnel .... The lack of atten-
tion paid to loss mitigation, particularly during the bubble years, meant that there was limited
loss mitigation capacity in the servicing system as mortgage defaults started to rise in 2006-
2007."). Levitin and Twomey provide a thoughtful and thorough analysis of the principal-
agent tension between MBS investors and servicers and the reasons the contractual arrange-
ments in place failed to mitigate this tension. See id at 69-84.
154. See Andrew Haughwout et al., Second Chances: Subprime Mortgage Modification
and Re-Default 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 417, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1527870 ("Modification of existing mortgages has historically been
quite unusual . . . ."). This stickiness may have appeared efficient ex ante by discouraging
strategic defaults. Tomasz Piskorski et al., Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotia-
tion: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 369, 394 (2010); see
Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 145, at 1102.
155. A separate obstacle to loan modifications is the existence of a second lien on the
same underlying home. Mayer et al., supra note 145, at 419.
156. Piskorski et al., supra note 154, at 371 ("Conditional on a loan becoming seriously
delinquent, we find that the foreclosure rate of bank-held loan [sic] is lower as compared to
securitized loans by around 3% to 7% in absolute terms (13% to 32% in relative terms).").
157. Sumit Agarwal et al., The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Renegotiation, 102 J.
FIN. ECON. 559, 560 (2011). Another study has found otherwise, but Piskorski et al. question
the robustness of those findings and the more precise methodology employed by Agarwal
and his co-authors resolves the debate. Compare Manuel Adelino et al., Why Don't Lenders
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zation creates a bias toward foreclosure, and they strongly suggest that securiti-
zation has hindered even efficient modifications.158
The evidence further suggests that even when loans are modified, loans
held by a bank are more likely to be modified in an efficient manner than a loan
that has been securitized. The same study that looked at the renegotiation ac-
tions of lenders found that "conditional on modification, portfolio-held loans
receive smaller concessions . . . . Yet, their post-modification performance is
stronger."l 59 It thus "appears that servicers renegotiate their own loans more
efficiently than they do loans owned by outside investors."1 60
Data compiled by federal regulators further suggest that even when a loan
is modified, the ways in which the terms of a loan are altered vary dramatically
depending upon whether it has been packaged into a fragmentation node. Data
for the fourth quarter of 2009 show that a homeowner who was granted a mod-
ification had a 27.7% chance of receiving a principal reduction if his loan was
retained by the originating bank, but only a 0.02% chance of such a reduction if
his loan instead was placed into a private-label MBS.161 In other words, in a
large sample of loans, roughly half of which were retained by the originating
bank and half of which were packaged into private-label MBSs, 99.9% of the
modifications involving a reduction in principal occurred in home loans re-
tained by the originating bank.162 This matters for the long-term performance
of the modified loans because the likelihood that a borrower will redefault on a
Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures and Securitization 3, 4-5 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,159, 2009), available at http://www.nber
.org/papers/w 15159 (finding low levels of loan renegotiations but no meaningful differences
in the effect of securitization on loan renegotiation rate between loans that had been securi-
tized and those that had not), with Piskorski et al., supra note 154, at 393-94 (describing li-
mitations in the methodology used by Adelino et al.), and Agarwal et al., supra, at 559-61
(describing the debate and explaining why their study resolves in favor of the position that
securitization does impact loan modification rates).
158. See Piskorski et al., supra note 154, at 394-95 (recognizing that market partici-
pants may not have anticipated the dramatic downturn in the housing market, so "govern-
ment initiatives facilitating renegotiation of securitized loans could benefit both borrowers
and investors").
159. Agarwal et al., supra note 157, at 575.
160. Id.
161. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION,
supra note 149, at 27 tbl.23. Of the 59,723 home loans modified during that period that were
either retained by the originating bank or packaged into a private-label MBS, 8431 included
a principal reduction, and all but five of those were retained by the bank rather than securi-
tized. See id. at 27 tbl.22.
162. Fifty-one percent of the loans in the relevant sample-30,459 out of 59,723-were
retained as part of a bank's portfolio. See id. at 27 tbl.22; see also Geanakoplos, supra note
33, at 120 ("Another indication that servicers have bad incentives is that when the big banks
hold the same kind of loans in their private portfolios, they do reduce principal."); Gretchen
Morgenson, Why Treasury Needs a Plan B for Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, at BI
("Studying second-quarter government data . . . , [Laurie] Goodman found that when banks
owned the loans, 30.5 percent of modifications reduced principal balances. When they ser-
vice someone else's loan . . . , they rarely allow principal reductions.").
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home loan is lower when the modification takes the form of a reduction in prin-
cipal.163 And, because banks that hold a home loan have a direct financial stake
in maximizing its value, these data provide further evidence that loans pack-
aged into a private-label MBS are granted principal reductions far less often
than would be efficient.
The different rate of loan modification and the different types of modifica-
tions made may be attributed to the stickiness that arises from the packaging of
a home loan into a fragmentation node. As a preliminary matter, the packaging
of home loans into a fragmentation node necessitates the use of an agent to ser-
vice those loans. The complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes then contri-
butes to stickiness by creating competing interests among different classes of
investors and giving rise to an array of other coordination challenges. Those
sources of stickiness make it difficult, if not impossible, to modify the servicing
agreement or to put into place any alternative mechanism enabling MBS inves-
tors to authorize modifications in the underlying loans. They further contribute
to excess foreclosures by incentivizing a servicer to interpret narrowly the
scope of its discretionary authority in order to avoid the risk of one tranche
claiming that the servicer acted inappropriately. As explained in one study of
servicer behavior, concern "about legal liability from dissatisfied investors, es-
pecially in cases where a modification benefits some MBS tranches at the ex-
pense of others," was cited by some servicers as a reason for not pursuing loan
modification more frequently. 164
The relative reluctance of servicers who do pursue loan modifications to
agree to a reduction in principal may also be attributable to a concern about the
disparate impact on different tranches. A reduction in the interest rate on a loan
generally leads to an incremental reduction in the cash flows coming into the
securitization vehicle over the remaining life of that loan. Because of the con-
tingent and dynamic interests of each of the tranches, it may not be immediate-
ly clear which tranches would be most affected and how adversely. A principal
reduction, by contrast, is generally recorded immediately and deducted fully
from the most junior tranche outstanding.165 This increases the likelihood of
holders of that tranche crying foul. 166 Reluctance to alter particular terms of a
loan is a more mild form of stickiness than reluctance to modify at all, but it is
still a form of stickiness and it arises from the same underlying causes.
163. See Haughwout et al., supra note 154, at 25-27; see also Morgenson, supra note
162.
164. Cordell et al., supra note 152, at 4, 22-23.
165. See Geanakoplos, supra note 33, at 119.
166. See Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 10, at 393 (noting that
one reason "[s]ervicers ... may . . . prefer foreclosure over restructuring" is that restructur-
ing presents a greater litigation risk, which "is exacerbated by the fact that, in many MBS,
CDO, and ABS CDO transactions, cash flows deriving from principal and interest are sepa-
rately allocated to different investor tranches"); see also Geanakoplos, supra note 33, at 119.
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To be clear, the claim here is not just about litigation risk. Legal reforms
were adopted to try to protect servicers from liability,167 and, while hard to
sever from other changes made around the same time, the reforms did not ap-
pear to have any substantial positive effect on the modification rate. 168 Nor
does the claim deny that other factors, like second liens and insufficient servic-
er incentives, may also contribute to stickiness. Nonetheless, concern about un-
fair treatment of particular tranches may well still have been a significant factor
in servicer recalcitrance. One of the core challenges highlighted here is that dif-
ferent tranches will be affected in disparate ways depending upon how a loan is
modified. At the same time, because of the heterogeneity of fragmentation
nodes, no single formula can be devised in the abstract and then applied across
the board. As a result, for any third party-be it the mortgage servicer or even a
federal regulator-to step in and substantially reduce the principal amount
owed on a loan or otherwise modify its terms without making a corresponding
change to the terms of the fragmentation nodes virtually ensures that some
tranches will be disproportionately harmed while others receive effective wind-
falls. This risk appropriately will make both servicers and federal regulators
more hesitant to intervene, even if they are lawfully empowered to do so.
This framing is important in part because it helps to explain why even the
government's attempts to shield servicers from liability have done little to in-
crease the rate of loan modifications, particularly principal writedowns. Just as
importantly, perhaps, it shows that the same dynamics that preclude private
market participants from modifying home loans may also inhibit effective gov-
ernment intervention. It could thus help to explain why the government's at-
tempts to forestall defaults and foreclosures have been so ineffective in light of
the magnitude of the problem, despite strong political support to address forec-
losures and falling home values.
While the challenges associated with the appointment of a servicer may be
viewed in significant part as a principal-agent problem, this tension was far
greater than it would have been had the principal been a single entity or even
numerous entities with perfectly aligned interests. The net effect was to make
the original terms of the home loans packaged into fragmentation nodes far
more sticky than they would otherwise have been. While both the specific me-
chanisms (the involvement of servicers) and the result (excess foreclosures) are
important, the core of these problems lies deeper, in the very structure of frag-
mentation nodes and the use of serial fragmentation nodes.
167. See, e.g., Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22,
§ 201, 123 Stat. 1632, 1638-40 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1639a (2006 & Supp. IV
2010)) (providing a servicer safe harbor for mortgage loan modifications).
168. See Geanakoplos, supra note 33, at 120 (noting that the new law did not lead to a
rise in loan modifications reducing principal).
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3. Stickiness and systemic risk
That the packaging of a home loan into a fragmentation node increases the
likelihood that the loan will be foreclosed may seem unfortunate for the home-
owners affected but not an issue of systemic significance. Had the packaging of
home loans into fragmentation nodes remained rare, this characterization may
have been accurate. However, once it became the norm for home loans to be
securitized, the systemic effects of these excess foreclosures (and hence of the
stickiness giving rise to them) changed dramatically.
As Anna Gelpern and Adam Levitin have explained, "[W]hen . . . rigid
contracts [like home loans packaged into fragmentation nodes] are ubiquitous,
they can function as social suicide pacts, compelling enforcement despite sig-
nificant externalities."l 69 Henry Hu and Bernard Black have also recognized
the potential for this type of stickiness to become a source of systemic risk. Ac-
cording to Hu and Black, once securitization becomes widespread for a class of
assets, such as home loans, this stickiness can lead to "gridlock-defaults
which could have been avoided if loans could have been renegotiated, and a
macro-level collapse in housing prices, which then drives up default risk for all
lenders." 170
In other words, the stickiness arising from securitization contributed, per-
haps significantly, to the falling home prices and the record rate of defaults
witnessed over the course of the crisis. This is because foreclosures cause home
values to fall further than they otherwise would, so a feedback loop forms. As
the last Subpart showed, stickiness results in more foreclosures than there
would have been had the home loans not been securitized. 171 Those excess fo-
reclosures depress home values further.172 Because the performance of home
loans generally, and subprime loans in particular, is closely linked to home val-
ues, this negative externality exacerbates the underlying problems-additional
homeowners are now unable to refinance, some of those homeowners default,
and some of those defaults which would best be addressed through a loan mod-
ification are instead foreclosed. The loop then repeats itself.
The magnitude of the role played by this stickiness is difficult to gauge, but
a study by Amir Khandani, Andrew Lo, and Robert Merton on the effects of
cash-out refinancings by homeowners suggests that the effect of a feedback
169. Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 145, at 1075; see also Piskorski et al., supra note
154, at 395.
170. Hu & Black, supra note 7, at 691.
171. See Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 145, at 1125 ("[Wlhere most home loans are
securitized under restrictive [servicing agreements], one would expect more foreclosures in
an economic downturn."); see also supra Part III.B.2.
172. Geanakoplos, supra note 33, at 107 ("Auction sales of foreclosed houses usually
bring 30 percent less than comparable houses sold by their owners. . . . [B]y going into fo-
reclosure, a borrower lowers housing prices and makes it more likely that his neighbor will
do the same."); Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 145, at 1125; Mayer et al., supra note 145, at
417.
709March 2012]1
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
loop in this area may be quite significant. The authors use a model to show that
the increased leverage in a typical home loan arising from cash-out refinancing
dramatically increased the fall in real estate values over the course of the crisis.
They identify as the reason "a destructive feedback loop of correlated foreclo-
sures, forced sales, and ultimately, a market crash."1 73 Because of the similarity
of the destructive feedback loop they identify, which they identify explicitly as
a source of systemic risk, and the feedback loop arising from the stickiness here
at issue, there is reason to suspect that the identified stickiness may have played
a significant contributory role in the dramatic decline in home values. 174
The ongoing foreclosure crisis, depressed home values, and the persistently
high incidence of bank closures-many of which have been accredited to losses
on real estate and construction loans, the value of which may also have fallen
as a result of the stickiness described here-further suggest that stickiness may
have been an important contributor to systemic risk.17 5 The connection between
this stickiness and those phenomena is necessarily speculative and-because of
massive federal intervention to overcome this stickiness and other challenges to
home-loan modifications-may remain so.176 Nonetheless, the evidence avail-
able supports the notion that the original terms of a home loan become sticky
when the loan is placed into a fragmentation node, and terms that make the
competitive tendency among the tranches particularly salient, such as the prin-
cipal value of the loan, become particularly sticky. Moreover, because of the
compounding of the coordination challenges that arise when one or more
tranches of an MBS are packaged into a serial fragmentation node, the terms of
the underlying loans become correspondingly stickier when a serial fragmenta-
tion node is added. As it became the norm for home loans to be packaged into
fragmentation nodes, those sources of stickiness became a source of systemic
risk. That risk became manifest when housing prices started to fall, leading to
excess foreclosures, which in turn fed a feedback loop of falling home values,
more excess foreclosures, and greater losses for financial institutions and others
holding mortgage securities or otherwise exposed to home values. This illu-
strates the way that pervasive stickiness may, as a general matter, contribute to
a feedback loop through which even a small adverse change can be amplified
significantly, leading to systemic effects that the parties creating the sticky ar-
rangements are not adequately incentivized to consider or avoid.
173. Khandani, Lo & Merton, supra note 26, at 3.
174. Foreclosures also contribute to other negative externalities, including adverse ef-
fects on the communities in which the foreclosed homes sit. See Gelpern & Levitin, supra
note 145, at 1125; Mayer et al., supra note 145, at 417.
175. See Sara Murray, Falling Home Prices Reveal Limits of Recovery, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 26, 2011, at A2 ("Home prices have buckled under excess housing supply, exacerbated
by foreclosures.").
176. See, e.g., Phillip Swagel, The Financial Crisis: An Inside View, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON EcoN. ACTIVITY, Spring 2009, at 1, 10-22, (providing a summary of the myriad
programs pursued by various federal agencies to address rising foreclosures in 2007 and
2008).
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This Part addresses the policy implications of the case study. The sources
of systemic risk identified here-information loss and stickiness arising from
complexity-bear little resemblance to the sources of systemic risk that regula-
tors have targeted traditionally. As we saw in Part I, however, systemic risk
regulation is a renewed priority of policymakers for good reason, and there is a
recognized need for new types of oversight, particularly macroprudential regu-
lations aimed at maintaining the stability of the financial system as a whole.
This Part suggests that regulations targeting complexity arising from the spread
of financial innovations should be among the tools that regulators use in that
endeavor.
A. Looking Back
Before examining what regulators could have done to address these sources
of systemic risk or what they should yet do, it is important to acknowledge that
these issues will almost assuredly not arise again in this context. There are nu-
merous reasons for this. First and foremost is that market participants, once
burned, will be twice shy before again buying complex mortgage securities. In
light of the amount of attention MBSs and CDOs received in the 2007-2009 fi-
nancial crisis and the taint that attention has cast on them, even market partici-
pants who believe that MBSs and CDOs may be good investments will proceed
with greater caution before acting on those beliefs. Moreover, various legal re-
forms specifically designed to address issues raised by the spread of MBSs and
CDOs, including efforts to improve the quality of home loans, have been or are
in the process of being put into place.' 7 ' The collective effect of such reforms,
combined with the greater caution of market participants, virtually ensures that
these particular securities will not again proliferate in ways giving rise to wide-
spread information loss and stickiness. This Article, accordingly, makes no ef-
fort to propose specific reforms to address the issues raised.
This Article also refrains from making any firm claims about the types of
policies regulators should have adopted prior to the financial crisis to address
these sources of systemic risk. The complexity here at issue came bundled with
an array of other effects, both positive and negative. Consistent with the aim of
this Article to function as a study in financial innovation, complexity, and sys-
temic risk, no effort has been made to catalogue all of the other costs and bene-
fits of securitization. Nor has this Article addressed how the benefits and costs
177. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 5301 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d,
77g, 78c, 78o, 78o-7, 78o-11, 1601-02, 1638-39, 1639c, 1639e, 1639h, 1640; 17 C.F.R. pts.
229, 232, 240, 249 (2011); Prohibition Against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitiza-
tions, 76 Fed. Reg. 60,320 (proposed Sept. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230)
(proposing rule implementing section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act).
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of regulations directly targeting the sources of systemic risk highlighted here
compare and interact with other tools for reducing systemic risk. In Part I we
saw that many of the reforms adopted to reduce systemic risk thus far may have
the effect of encouraging innovations like securitization. This strongly suggests
that efforts to reduce systemic risk arising from the spread of such innovations
may be important complements to reforms targeting financial institutions. Non-
etheless, it is beyond the scope of this Article to compare more directly the
benefits and costs of interventions targeting these sources of systemic risk rela-
tive to other efforts to maintain the stability of the financial system.
The preceding analysis, however, does provide a foundation from which
we can draw inferences about the efficacy of different modes of regulation. By
examining the benefits and costs of different regulatory responses that could
have been adopted prior to the recent financial crisis to address information loss
and stickiness, this Part sheds light on how effective different types of regula-
tions are likely to be in reducing the sources of systemic risk at issue. In so
doing, it sheds light on the types of tools that may be helpful to regulators as
they seek to address systemic risk arising from the spread of other financial
innovations.
B. Looking Ahead
1. Disclosure
Disclosure is one of the most commonly used tools in financial regulation
and has been identified as potentially valuable in alleviating both of the sources
of systemic risk identified here.17 8 Better disclosure, by its nature, should re-
duce information loss, and increased transparency could reduce the magnitude
of the coordination challenges that lead to stickiness. The preceding analysis,
however, makes clear that disclosure alone will not suffice.
Recall that CDOs were distributed almost exclusively to large, sophisti-
cated investors generally capable (or at least presumed to be capable under ap-
plicable securities laws) of identifying, obtaining, and processing the informa-
tion required to evaluate a potential investment. The rapid rate at which these
transactions proliferated suggests that investors believed they had obtained suf-
ficient information about the securities to make an investment decision. Yet, as
the discussion of information loss in Part III makes clear, the amount of infor-
mation most of these investors obtained and processed was far from complete.
These statements are not inherently consistent. Because of the costs to investors
of obtaining and processing information, it may be rational for an investor to
make an investment with far less than perfect information. The challenge for
policymakers is that the level of resources that an investor seeking to maximize
178. See, e.g., Hu & Black, supra note 7, at 693; Scott & Taylor, supra note 88.
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its own returns will invest in gathering information may well be less than is so-
cially optimal. Accordingly, disclosure reforms can reduce but will not elimi-
nate this mismatch.
A recent study by Robert Bartlett supports the conjecture that mandating
greater disclosure would not have prevented this source of systemic risk. Bar-
tlett shows that a major hedge fund with demonstrated analytic capability and a
strong financial incentive (in the form of a significant short position with re-
spect to an insurance company with significant MBS and CDO exposure) none-
theless failed to utilize available information about the specific MBSs underly-
ing CDO transactions insured by the company in analyzing the company's
exposure and expected losses on the insurance policies.17 9 Based upon that
failure and the contrast between the market's reaction to downgrades in CDOs
the company insured and downgrades in corporate debt the company insured,
Bartlett concludes that his results "are strongly suggestive that enhancing de-
rivative disclosures, by itself, is unlikely to reduce the uncertainty that often
plagues analysis of a firm's exposure to complex credit derivatives such as
CDOs." so Similarly, better disclosure might reduce, but will not eliminate, the
myriad coordination challenges that give rise to stickiness. While disclosure
might lower the costs of identifying the other holders, for example, it cannot
eliminate the conflicts that arise from situations that cause the latent competi-
tive tendencies among the tranches to become manifest.
This is not an argument against disclosure. Without disclosure, these prob-
lems would likely be substantially worse. Nonetheless, this analysis does sug-
gest an inherent limit on the efficacy of disclosure to address these sources of
systemic risk. This case study, accordingly, provides support for the position,
already endorsed by others, that there are significant limitations on the capacity
of disclosure to address the risks associated with complex financial
innovations. 181
2. Chain length
The clear inadequacy of disclosure raises the question of what other tools
regulators might use to address the sources of systemic risk here at issue. Hav-
ing shown that these risks arose from specific sources of complexity inherent in
fragmentation nodes, one response could be to seek ways to reduce those
sources of complexity. While the potential benefits of such regulations are
clear, so too are the potential pitfalls. Steven Schwarcz, for example, has
warned against this type of direct intervention. As he explains, "Complexity is
179. See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study
ofDerivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis 36 J. Corp. L. 1 (2010).
180. Id. at 7.
181. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 16-17; Brunnermeier & Oehmke, supra note 82, at 2
(discussing investor information overload); Turner, supra note 98.
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not an end in itself but usually is a by-product of salutary goals such as seeking
to transfer risk to parties better positioned to hold the risk and reducing the cost
of funding businesses. The harm averted by [proscribing transactions] would,
therefore, likely exceed its benefits."l82 This concern, while appropriate, does
not provide a sufficient basis for completely avoiding regulations targeting par-
ticular modes of financial innovation.
As a preliminary matter, virtually all regulations have costs. Costs are rea-
sons to avoid a mode of regulation only if they exceed the expected benefits or
if there are less costly ways to achieve the desired result. Neither condition can
be assumed in this context. Moreover, as discussed in Part I with respect to cap-
ital adequacy requirements, even traditional approaches to systemic risk regula-
tion often involve limiting activities known to create value when times are good
in order to promote the stability of the financial system when the good times
end.
Put differently, the fact that a transaction creates value on a localized basis
does not mean that the transaction should not be regulated, as it may be socially
optimal to prevent such transactions. In order for any transaction to be efficient
on net, it must not only create value, but the value created must exceed the
costs associated with the transaction, including increased systemic risk. It is
precisely because the parties to a transaction will never be adequately incenti-
vized to avoid systemic risk that regulation is required. As illustrated by the
sources of systemic risk at issue here, many sources of systemic risk are the
byproduct of activities which, viewed in isolation, create value. It is for this
reason that Henry Hu has emphasized that regulators have a particular duty to
be mindful of, and responsive to, the systemic effects of financial innova-
tion. 183 When the systemic effects associated with the spread of a particular in-
novation include increased systemic risk, interventions that preclude otherwise
beneficial transactions may be justified.
The question thus becomes: how might regulators reduce the highlighted
sources of complexity while not overly restricting financial innovation and net
beneficial transactions? There were numerous developments in the evolution of
MBS and CDO transactions described in Part II that increased their complexity
and the complexity of the capital markets in ways that contributed to both in-
formation loss and stickiness. Most of those developments, however, added on-
ly incrementally to these phenomena. Increasing the number and variety of
tranches, for example, increased the informational burden on potential investors
and the potential coordination challenges, but the additional information loss
and stickiness that resulted were roughly proportional to the incremental devel-
opment. Trying to create rules to limit such developments would be a difficult
182. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 239 (footnote omitted).
183. See Hu, supra note 7, at 1502-03.
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task, likely requiring some relatively arbitrary line-drawing.18 4 This Subpart
suggests that regulators should instead seek to intervene at points where there is
a nonlinear increase in the sources of complexity at issue with no correspond-
ing jump in the potential value created. Because the addition of a fragmentation
node between the investor and the asset ultimately underlying its investment is
precisely such a development, regulators could have sought ways to reduce the
number of fragmentation nodes along that chain. Two examples illustrate this
approach.
a. Discourage serialfragmentation nodes
The packaging of financial instruments that have already gone through one
fragmentation node into a second fragmentation node magnifies the resultant
information loss and stickiness. By increasing exponentially the number of un-
derlying assets, using assets that themselves are complex financial instruments,
and using more complex structures, a CDO investor faces a far greater informa-
tion burden than an MBS investor. This results in significantly greater informa-
tion loss. Moreover, because CDOs often acquired the most informationally
sensitive tranches of MBSs issued, the rise of CDOs played a critical role in the
systematic loss of information about the quality of the underlying home loans
and the value of securities backed by them. Similarly, while the packaging of a
home loan into an MBS gives rise to stickiness as a result of coordination and
other challenges, those issues are magnified when one or more tranches of that
MBS is packaged into a CDO. Restricting serial fragmentation nodes would
thus have gone a long way toward reducing the information loss and stickiness
arising from these transactions.
To be sure, restricting serial fragmentation nodes may have precluded
some beneficial transactions. Nonetheless, the potential benefits of serial nodes
are far less evident than the benefits arising from the creation of the initial
fragmentation node, a fact that was apparent well before the crisis hit.'18 This
not only makes it likely that the benefits of regulations targeting serial fragmen-
tation nodes are likely to exceed the costs, but also suggests that the costs of a
regulatory error are likely to be relatively small.
184. Another policy option not discussed here is for regulators to work with market par-
ticipants to encourage standardization, Particularly in light of the degree to which hetero-
geneity increased the informational burden on investors and reduced the options available ex
post to address the coordination issues that arose, facilitating standardization could be anoth-
er important role for regulators to play. See, e.g., NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS
EcoNoMIcs: A CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 193-94 (2010) (advocating stan-
dardization). Notably, however, others have argued that standardization can actually result in
increased systemic risk. See, e.g., Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96
CORNELL L. REv. 323, 327 (2011).
185. As described in Part It, the primary benefits of securitization, such as enabling the
separation of origination and ownership and pooling to provide diversification, are accom-
plished with a single node.
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It is also critical to recognize that regulators could have targeted serial
fragmentation nodes without banning such transactions outright. Regulators
could have, for example, made an upward adjustment on the risk-adjusted capi-
tal charge imposed on banks and other regulated entities for assets that have
passed through serial fragmentation nodes.186 Alternatively, regulators could
have imposed a transaction tax solely on transactions constituting a serial frag-
mentation node. These types of interventions do not require regulators to
second-guess the value arising from a transaction; they merely create a higher
threshold that must be satisfied, in terms of localized value creation, to offset
the potential for the transaction to contribute to systemic risk."'
b. Encourage simplifying alternatives
For the same reasons that it may have been appropriate for regulators to
discourage serial fragmentation nodes, regulators could have attempted to re-
duce the number of fragmentation nodes separating investor and investment by
encouraging financial innovations that shorten, and thereby simplify, the chain
separating these two ends. Had U.S. regulators looked abroad for such altema-
tives to MBSs and CDOs, they would have found a prime candidate-the cov-
ered bond. Covered bonds were used frequently in Europe prior to the financial
crisis and have proven far more resilient than private-label MBSs.18 8
Covered bonds are similar to MBSs in that they are backed by a pool of as-
sets, such as home loans. They are different, however, in that they remain direct
obligations of the financial intermediary that issues them, and that intermediary
must replace the underlying assets if they fail to perform. As a result, as econ-
omist Hyun Song Shin has explained, in contrast to an MBS the "pool serves
mainly as credit enhancement and not as a means to obtain exposure to the un-
derlying assets."189 The net effect of using covered bonds is thus a "shortening
of the intermediation chain" separating investor and investment. 190
186. The viability of such interventions is supported by the fact that regulations in the
nature of those proposed have been adopted in response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK
1, 30 (2009) (adding the concept of "resecuritisation exposures" and imposing higher risk
weights for such assets than for other securitized assets).
187. Cf Fin. Economists Roundtable, Reforming the OTC Derivatives Markets, J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 2010, at 40, 43 (2010) (proposing regulatory changes to the
derivatives market that would effectively heighten the minimum "marginal benefit of new
products" while not forbidding further innovation, on the basis that the overall scheme pro-
posed would reduce systemic risk).
188. See From Prussia with Love: The Covered Bond, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 2008, at
80, 80 (noting that "covered bonds have grown into a $3 trillion asset class, dominated by
issuers in Europe," and describing certain advantages of these securities over MBSs).
189. Hyun Song Shin, Financial Intermediation and the Post-Crisis Financial System
14 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 304, 2010).
190. Id. at 13, 15.
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The use of covered bonds could substantially mitigate both information
loss and stickiness.191 Because the financial intermediary issuing the covered
bonds remains directly liable, it has an incentive to understand the expected
value and risks inherent in each of the underlying home loans. It also has the
incentive and ability to modify the loan in the face of dramatically changed cir-
cumstances. Moreover, like efforts to discourage serial fragmentation nodes,
this type of intervention could have been implemented in a variety of ways. In
light of the frequency with which covered bonds are used in other countries and
the demand by U.S. investors for covered bonds, removing regulatory con-
straints on the use of covered bonds and putting regulations into place to facili-
tate their issuance. might have been sufficient to spur banks to issue covered
bonds. 192 Regulators also could have pursued more aggressive policies, such as
incentivizing regulated entities to acquire covered bonds, without mandating
the issuance of covered bonds.
c. Market forces
It is important to note that the proposed interventions facilitate, as well as
impede, market forces. This is possible because of the many types of market
forces at work in the capital markets. Some of those forces, including those we
have relied upon to produce an efficient and stable financial system, involve
market participants making varying assessments of the expected future cash
flows from a financial instrument, then buying, selling, and engaging in other
activity based upon their assessments. The failure of these market forces played
a central role in the 2007-2009 financial crisis and can have significant costs
even apart from circumstances giving rise to a financial crisis. 193
As we saw in Part II, the market forces driving the spread of fragmentation
nodes backed by home loans were very different in nature. Those market forces
arose primarily from investor demand for financial instruments with particular
characteristics, such as a AAA rating and a relatively high rate of interest. The
preceding account also showed how the latter type of market forces (those aris-
191. There are also policy considerations apart from the reduction of these sources of
systemic risk for regulators to encourage the use of covered bonds in lieu of MBSs. See, e.g.,
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Conundrum of Covered Bonds, 66 Bus. LAW. 561, 573-86 (2011);
Shin, supra note 189, at 13-15.
192. See Covered Bond Policy Statement, 73 Fed. Reg. 21,949, 21,950 (Apr. 23, 2008)
(explaining that insured deposit institutions have expressed an interest in issuing covered
bonds and have sought guidance from the FDIC regarding applicable regulations); Prabha
Natarajan, Covered Bonds from Canada Set Record, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2010, at C6; Shin,
supra note 189, at 14-15.
193. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Keynote Address at the Eighth BIS Annual Conference: Inter-
preting the Causes of the Great Recession of 2008 (June 25-26, 2009), in FINANCIAL SYSTEM
AND MACROECONOMIC RESILIENCE: REVISITED 4, 9-10 (Monetary & Econ. Dep't, Bank for
Int'l Settlements, BIS Papers No. 53, 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publfbppdf/
bispap53.pdf
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ing from investor demands for financial instruments with particular characteris-
tics) can impede the efficient operation of the former type of market forces
(those focused on the fundamental value of the projects underlying the financial
instruments).194 Accordingly, the proposed regulatory interventions could be
characterized as efforts to restrain certain market forces which have the poten-
tial to increase systemic risk, so that other market forces, which are more likely
to promote the efficiency and stability of the financial system, may play a rela-
tively greater role in shaping the capital markets.195
The possibility that reducing the number of fragmentation nodes separating
investor and investment may promote market efficiency is critical to under-
standing why such reforms may be warranted even with other reforms that
might address information loss or stickiness. One might, for example, argue
that reforms to reduce information loss are unnecessary in light of policy re-
forms intended to improve the accuracy of credit ratings. It is true that the loss
of information about the quality of the underlying loans and various securities
backed by them would have been far less problematic had the ratings given to
MBSs and CDOs been more accurate.196 Nonetheless, the process of assessing
the probability that a security will default is one that necessarily requires mak-
ing numerous judgment calls about which reasonable minds can differ. 197 A
capital market system in which one entity makes an informed decision about
the likelihood of default-and hence, the value of a debt instrument-and other
investors blindly accept the accuracy of that assessment is not the model of the
capital markets we have relied upon to produce a stable and efficient system for
the allocation of capital. Moreover, as we saw in the theoretical account of the
reasons that information loss may increase the fragility of the financial system,
investors acting in reliance on others' assessments rather than on the basis of
194. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Unstable Banking, 97 J. FIN. ECoN. 306,
306-07 (2010) (showing that steps taken by financial intermediaries to cater to shifting in-
vestor sentiment can increase the instability of the financial system).
195. See Lawrence G. Baxter, Internationalisation of Law-The "Complex" Case of
Bank Regulation, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW: LEGISLATING, DECISION-MAKING,
PRACTICE AND EDUCATION 3, 23 (Mary Hiscock & William van Caenegem eds., 2010) ("The
principal consideration in attempting to reshape a dangerously unstable complex system such
as international banking [is how to] encourage[] more spontaneous self-ordering.").
196. One challenge may be that the investors who were acquiring the AAA-rated MBSs
and CDOs prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis were doing so based on the assumption that
the securities were "information insensitive," and thus those investors would not do any due
diligence regardless. While perhaps accurate as a descriptive matter for some of the inves-
tors, as we saw above, the demand was not just for AAA-rated assets, but AAA-rated assets
providing a higher rate of return than other similarly rated assets, like U.S. Treasury bonds.
Despite the possible shortage of truly information-insensitive securities relative to the de-
mand, it should come as little surprise to sophisticated investors that securities offering a
higher rate of return have some credit risk and should be assessed accordingly.
197. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 109, at 560-62 (explaining that "two different
types of information bear[] on asset price: the 'hard' information of known facts, and the
'soft' information of forecasts and estimates," so even a person aware of every relevant hard
fact "would lack a type of information critical to price determination").
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actual information are likely to react quickly and dramatically if a signal comes
to light suggesting financial instruments they own are riskier than they had rea-
lized. 198 In such an environment, even an erroneous signal could cause wide-
spread panic and deleterious market disruptions. To be clear, the claim here is
not that rating-agency reform is not warranted. As stated at the outset, the ac-
count of the crisis provided here and the policy responses proposed are in-
tended to complement rather than compete with other accounts. The rating
agencies clearly failed in the task assigned to them in the years leading up to
the crisis, and their failures certainly contributed to the crisis, so rating-agency
reform is clearly warranted. Rather, the claim here is that such reforms, even if
successful, will not obviate the importance of structural reforms of the type
proposed in this Article.
Similarly, one could argue that market participants and regulators, appre-
ciative of how problematic stickiness can be, can now devise tools narrowly
designed to address the issue. Securitization transactions backed by other asset
types, for example, at times give agents greater authority and incentives to
modify the terms of the underlying assets. 199 Similar schemes could, in theory,
be imported into MBSs and CDOs. The challenge presented by stickiness,
however, is not the narrow question of whether we can modify home loans
packaged into fragmentation nodes. The challenge is that each time a debt in-
strument is created, that instrument cannot feasibly address in detail how the
rights of the parties should be altered for every possible state of the world that
might arise over the life of the instrument. As a result, there will necessarily be
situations governed by standards ill-suited to address a particular set of cir-
cumstances, and other situations left completely unaddressed. The insufficient
discretion and incentives given to servicers to modify home loans in the face of
dramatic declines in the price of real estate is merely illustrative of the types of
gaps that are unavoidable when a loan is transformed from a bilateral relation-
ship between a bank and a homeowner into an asset traded in the capital mar-
kets. There is no simple or abstract solution to this challenge.
This Article has introduced the notion of a fragmentation node, and pro-
posed tools that could be used to reduce the number of nodes separating inves-
tor and investment, because such structural reforms have the potential to reduce
both of these challenges irrespective of what the future holds. The longer and
more complex the chain separating investor and investment, the more difficult
it will be for investors to engage in due diligence and make an informed, inde-
pendent assessment of the value of the security he is acquiring. Likewise, the
length and complexity of the chain tend to increase the stickiness of each of its
components, inhibiting even efficient changes in their terms should circums-
tances arise that were not adequately addressed at the time the underlying fi-
nancial instruments and other components were created. When a particular fi-
198. See supra Part III.A.2.
199. See, e.g., Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 145, at 1103.
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nancial innovation spreads and becomes pervasive, these tendencies can in-
crease the fragility of the overall system. As we saw in the discussion of the
reasons for regulating systemic risk in Part 1, these are the types of develop-
ments that no market participant will be adequately incentivized to identify and
address. While the number of fragmentation nodes separating investor and in-
vestment is a rough proxy for the effects here at issue, it is at least a viable one.
Accordingly, identifying and targeting new innovative financial structures that
change the landscape of the capital markets in ways akin to the changes
wrought by fragmentation nodes may be an important component of policy ef-
forts to reduce systemic risk. The next Subpart addresses other counterargu-
ments to this claim.
C. Some Challenges
1. Recurrence
A core challenge in any case study is determining how broadly its findings
apply. Even if one accepts the role played by information loss and stickiness in
the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the potential utility of intervention, that new
understanding means little if the issues were unique to that crisis. But in fact,
the same issues are likely to recur.
Despite the dampening effect the 2007-2009 financial crisis has had on the
rate of financial innovation, there are reasons to expect ongoing innovation in
the years ahead. As a preliminary matter, recent history is replete with disasters
perceived to be so great that they made major reforms slowing financial inno-
vation seem inevitable, but that never in fact triggered significant changes. For
example, Enron's bankruptcy in 2001 following its abuse of structured-finance
transactions-a field of finance that includes securitization-led many to be-
lieve that market participants and regulators would be more skeptical of struc-
tured finance and more discerning in their evaluation of complex transactions.
Similarly, the nearly cataclysmic collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital
Management in 1998 led many to expect that financial institutions would adopt
more effective risk-management regimes and be more cautious about the poten-
tial risks, particularly systemic risks, to which they might be exposed. The
dramatic rise in securitization transactions and other developments leading up
to the recent financial crisis belied these expectations.
In addition, the recently adopted Dodd-Frank Act and other legal responses
to the financial crisis will likely operate as an impetus for further financial in-
novation. The desire to reduce the cost of regulatory compliance (i.e., regulato-
ry arbitrage) is one of the key drivers of financial innovation generally.200
Moreover, as discussed in Part I, many of the specific reforms adopted impose
200. See Calomiris, supra note 92, at 65-66; see also PARTNOY, supra note 7, at 48.
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new costs on banks and other financial institutions, increasing the potential
economic gains from innovations that enable funding activities traditionally
performed by banks to be moved into the capital markets. Securitization is pre-
cisely such an innovation. Accordingly, once economic conditions revive, we
can expect to see a rise in financial innovations like securitization and the sha-
dow banking system of which it is a part.
Another consideration, reflected in the descriptive account in Part II, is the
intense pressure on banks and other financial institutions to develop and exploit
new financial innovations. As Henry Hu has explained, "To stay competitive,
banks constantly introduce new financial products because margins on products
decline quickly." 20' Neither the financial crisis nor the responses to it have re-
duced those competitive pressures. Other academic experts have also taken the
view that despite the financial crisis, financial innovation will continue, if not
accelerate, in the coming years.202 Thus, although the specific events examined
above are unlikely to arise again, the overall trend of financial innovation is
likely to continue, and an appropriately framed case study may provide valua-
ble insights into some of the challenges and opportunities such developments
create for regulators seeking to limit systemic risk.203
The question thus becomes whether financial innovations are likely to give
rise to the types of issues revealed in this case study. Again, there are reasons to
expect this is possible if not probable. The most obvious way these issues could
again arise would be in the context of fragmentation nodes backed by assets
other than home loans. A wide array of asset classes, including auto loans, air-
craft leases, computer leases, credit card receivables, franchise loans, health-
care receivables, health club receivables, music royalties, tax liens, taxi medal-
lion loans, and viatical settlements have been packaged into fragmentation
nodes. Such transactions ground to a halt during the 2007-2009 financial crisis,
but the market has started to revive. 204 Some commentators have even sug-
gested that the failure of MBSs and CDOs could lead to greater investor de-
mand for the types of asset-backed securities that performed relatively well
during the financial crisis.205 At the same time, in light of the market and legal
201. Hu, supra note 7, at 1479 (footnote omitted); see also Charles W. Calomiris, The
Subprime Turmoil: What's Old, What's New, and What's Next, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Spring
2009, at 6, 43 ("The structure of U.S. financial intermediation will probably undergo signifi-
cant changes over the next few years . . . [as t]he American financial system, if it remains
true to its history, will adapt and innovate its way back to profitability and high stock pric-
es .... .").
202. E.g., Andrew W. Lo & Robert C. Merton, Preface to the Annual Review of Finan-
cial Economics, I ANN. REV. FIN. EcoN. 1, 12 (2009) ("[T]he implementation of financial
innovation is likely to be more rapid because the threshold for change is lower.").
203. The issue of how broadly the dynamics revealed in this study may be applied is
addressed in Part IV.A.
204. See, e.g., GORTON, supra note 31, at 22 tbl.2.1 (identifying types of assets that
have been securitized).
205. E.g., Calomiris, supra note 201, at 41-42.
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responses to securitization in the wake of the crisis, it is possible that fragmen-
tation nodes will not again give rise to the sources of systemic risk at issue.
Even outside the realm of securitization, however, complexity arising from
the spread of new financial innovations may well result in information loss and
stickiness. Many financial innovations, particularly those that could be used to
shift financing activities from regulated banks into the capital markets, involve
the parsing and repackaging of various rights and risks. As a result, many if not
all of the sources of complexity identified as inherent in fragmentation nodes-
fragmentation, creation of contingent and dynamic economic interests, a latent
competitive tendency among the different classes of investors, and the leng-
thening of the chain separating investor and investment-are likely also to be
present in new financial innovation. And, for the reasons we saw in Part III,
such innovations are likely to give rise to both massive informational burdens
that make information loss likely and coordination challenges causing effects
like stickiness.
New financial innovations may also give rise to new sources of complexity
unlike those produced by fragmentation nodes, which could also give rise to
effects like information loss and stickiness. While the exact ways in which in-
novations may create complexity and impede information flows are difficult to
foresee, that innovation and the complexity resulting from it will lead to infor-
mation losses seems probable, if not certain.
To be sure, information loss and stickiness do not always give rise to sys-
temic risk. The account of how information loss and stickiness arising from
MBS and CDO transactions contributed to the 2007-2009 financial crisis rested
upon the fact that these transactions had become pervasive, taking on systemic
dimensions in the years leading up to the crisis. Had these transactions re-
mained rare, information loss and stickiness would not have contributed to sys-
temic risk in the ways detailed above. As the case study also made clear, how-
ever, when an innovation appears to create value on a localized basis, financial
intermediaries have a strong financial incentive to exploit that opportunity, and
to be creative in doing so, making it likely that such innovations will evolve
and proliferate. Accordingly, the small likelihood of recurrence of a mortgage-
security bubble is no reason for regulators to ignore the more general sources of
systemic risk at issue here.
2. Identification
Another challenge could be that it is simply impractical to ask regulators to
identify these sources of systemic risk before they become manifest. While this
case study may enable regulators to identify and respond to the complexity aris-
ing from the spread of MBSs and CDOs, the dangers of those instruments have
already been made plain by the crisis. If complexity from the proliferation of a
new financial innovation arises, it will look too different for regulators to readi-
ly recognize its capacity to contribute to information loss and stickiness. It is
722 [Vol. 64:657
FRA GMENTA TION NODES
the complexity that regulators do not see, much less understand, that is most
likely to be problematic.
Such concerns are merited. The most pernicious forms of complexity may
well be disguised in sheep's clothing. As we saw in the story of MBSs and
CDOs, for example, the Gaussian copula and other similar devices played a key
role by providing market participants and regulators a plausible basis for be-
lieving that the complexity arising from fragmentation nodes could be managed
even without being understood directly. Similar stories are likely to accompa-
ny, and perhaps disguise, the complexity of future financial innovations. A re-
lated challenge, also illustrated in the case study, is that both the complexity of
individual instruments and the complexity in the market arising from their pro-
liferation develop incrementally. The incremental nature of these processes
may result in market participants and regulators alike becoming overly accept-
ing of innovations already used with apparent success, further adding to the
regulatory challenge. While there are no easy answers to these issues, they are
not a reason to avoid this type of regulation.
As a starting point, the analysis in Part II suggested some responses to
these challenges. First, regulators and others concerned about systemic risk can
seek ways to evaluate innovations with fresh eyes. Such perspective shifting
might have led, for example, to greater questioning of the efficacy of the me-
chanisms used to minimize the moral hazard inherent in the originate-to-
distribute mode of banking as the market for mortgage securities grew and
evolved. Second, regulators can seek ways to take a step back and consider the
systemic consequences of the evolution and proliferation of particular modes of
financial innovation, mindful of the possibility that the aggregate effects of
those developments may be qualitatively different from the effects of any indi-
vidual transaction. The introduction of the term "fragmentation node," along
with identification of other types of "nodes" that may be found along the chain
separating investor and underlying asset, may facilitate such perspective shift-
ing. In short, while it may not be easy for regulators to identify these types of
systemic risk in a timely fashion, the fact that they are not self-evident is a rea-
son for-not against-regulatory scrutiny.
3. Response
A closely related counterargument is that even if regulators do identify a
potential issue, determining when and how to intervene is too challenging a
task for regulators to undertake, particularly considering the possibility of error.
Like the challenge of identifying problematic financial innovations, however,
these concerns justify regulatory caution but not abdication.
Determining when to intervene, for example, does pose a real challenge.
The accounts of systemic risk provided in Part III each hinged upon the perva-
siveness of fragmentation nodes backed by home loans. If regulators delay in-
tervention until a particular innovation is sufficiently pervasive to be a signifi-
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cant source of systemic risk, however, it may be far more difficult to intervene
productively. Ultimately, determining when to intervene may depend upon the
mode of intervention and the nature of the risk. Mild interventions, such as reg-
ulatory or other legal changes to facilitate a more favorable mode of financial
innovation (like covered bonds), or efforts to work with market participants to
encourage standardization, may be appropriate before there is any indication of
trouble. Regulatory interventions that place a clear thumb on the scale, such as
adjustments in capital adequacy requirements, may merit a slightly higher thre-
shold. Proscriptions and other more draconian interventions should be used
sparingly and only when regulators have an adequate understanding of the ben-
efits and risks of the financial innovation in question.
As with efforts to identify problematic sources of complexity, particular
indicia may aid regulators in this task. The fact that a financial innovation faci-
litates regulatory arbitrage may, for example, be a sign that regulators should
act sooner rather than later. This is both because to the extent regulatory arbi-
trage drives a transaction, there is less reason to assume that it creates any real
value, even on a localized basis, and also because regulated entities share a
common incentive to find ways around costly regulations, making an innova-
tion that enables such arbitrage likely to spread.
It may also be appropriate for different regulators, or the same regulator
taking action with respect to different types of regulated entities, to act at dif-
ferent times. As reflected in the current regulatory scheme, different regulated
entities may pose very different risks and thus are appropriately subject to very
different types of regulations. Money market funds, for example, are subject to
far more stringent limitations on the assets they can hold than most other regu-
lated entities. There are a variety of reasons for this: money market funds' fear
of "breaking the buck," constraints on the efficacy of market checks, and the
critical role the funds play in the provision of short-term financing.206 It may
accordingly be appropriate for the SEC, which has oversight authority over
money market funds, to be particularly aggressive in ensuring that the funds do
not acquire assets with risks they cannot easily assess. Such an approach would
have the advantage of allowing various regulatory bodies to learn from one
another before instituting their own rules.
As a general matter, the policy proposals set forth above provide a frame-
work for the type of interventions likely to be effective. The process of translat-
ing these ideas into practice will need to be responsive to a number of context-
specific considerations. This need for customization limits the extent of useful
guidance that can be provided in the abstract, but it is not a reason to avoid this
type of regulation altogether.
206. See Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,807,
74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 32,689-90 (proposed July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270,
274).
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CONCLUSION
While the next financial crisis will inevitably look different from the one
that just passed, how different it is and how many years pass before it strikes
depend in part on how effectively we learn the lessons of the recent crisis. This
Article adds to the growing body of work seeking to ensure that the next finan-
cial crisis does not arise prematurely. By exploring the interplay of financial
innovation, complexity, and systemic risk, this Article has shed light on the
ways the complexity arising from the spread of financial innovations may con-
tribute to systemic risk and on the tools that may be most effective in address-
ing those sources of systemic risk.
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